

# AN IDEOLOGY FOR FILIPINOS

President  
Ferdinand  
E. Marcos



AN  
IDEOLOGY  
FOR  
FILIPINOS



Copyright 1980

BY FERDINAND E. MARCOS

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or used in any manner as textbook, reference, outline, manual or workbook for instruction in schools without permission in writing from the author.



# CONTENTS

*Page*

i	PREFATORY NOTE	
1	CHAPTER ONE	THE IDEOLOGICAL QUESTION
13	CHAPTER TWO	THE EGALITARIAN IDEAL
23	CHAPTER THREE	REVOLUTION FROM THE CENTER
37	CHAPTER FOUR	POPULAR PARTICIPATION
53	CHAPTER FIVE	SOCIAL JUSTICE AND OUR PEOPLE
63	CHAPTER SIX	INTERNAL REVOLUTION
75	CHAPTER SEVEN	FOR A NEW SOCIETY
85	INDEX	



## **Prefatory Note**

I have put down these thoughts on a Filipino ideology for the consideration of our people, both directly and through their proper representations: The interim Batasang Pambansa and the Barangays. I have adopted a simple and straightforward style so that these notes may be thoroughly discussed. While they may be personal to me—as well as the vision they pursue—these reflections have been guided by the unarticulated aspirations of the Filipinos since their dream of independence and liberation.

It goes without saying that an ideology does not spring to life in a flash of revelation. Consequently, no man can pretend to be the single source of any set of concepts and principles by which action may be guided. As the dictionary meaning of the word suggests—"the integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program"—ideology cannot but be the accumulation of the thoughts and beliefs of uncounted individuals and groups, including that faceless entity we call the people. I will not presume to say, therefore, that the ideas and opinions contained in this essay are the rock of truth, and much less that they are my exclusive handiwork. My only claim is to the initiative of expressing them in a manner which I offer with trepidation, knowing all the pitfalls that await every author.

This essay, then, is not a positive declaration of an ideology, but an attempt to capture between the covers of a book the essence thus far of the thoughts and experiences which have anything to do with crafting a national mode of life and influencing our future. Far from being timeless and permanent, they await further refinement, modification or even complete change, tasks which will undoubtedly be done by scholars and academicians, professionals, political leaders, legislators, educators—and by the people themselves through their various interactions with circumstances and events. At best, one can only say that we are all involved, consciously or not, in working towards an ideology for Filipinos by a process of slow and even imperceptible accretion and synthesis. "An Ideology For Filipinos" is a minute contribution to that process.



## CHAPTER ONE

### THE IDEOLOGICAL QUESTION

MANY OF our thinkers believe that one of the things we need to ensure the success of our program of government is an *ideology*. There can really be no disagreement about the significance of ideology to our national planning. Questions arise only on the level of ontology—that is, on whether or not our conception of the New Society is predicated on an ideology.

Obviously, it is not enough to say that our programs and plans rest on some ideology or other. To quiet the anxiety of our compatriots, it is necessary to spell out in some detail our ideological commitment. This is why I find it fitting to sit down and review once again our conception of a good society for our people—this time from the standpoint of ideology.

I address this essay primarily to those of us who are not satisfied with piecemeal justifications, much less with pragmatic programs and arguments; to those of us who



prefer justifications or logical conclusions that acquire the character of ultimate and self-evident principles.

In *Notes on the New Society II*, I remarked that with respect to ideology we must be satisfied with partial systems. That remark was *not* an exercise in evasion. While ideology is important, it can also be dangerous: for ideology can so easily become a dogma, which pretends to contain within itself enduring truths about practically anything in the world. If an ideology is to go beyond platitudes and truisms, if it is to link up with the practical concerns of man and society, then it must keep itself open to possibilities or contingencies that we are not able to anticipate.

An ideology is rather like a scientific theory, whose validity depends on its constant demonstration by observed regularity. As soon as new experiences emerge which a scientific theory cannot account for, we begin to doubt the theory's adequacy.

If scientific theories are taken to be tentative, it is only because the scientists realize their limitations; or better still, scientists know only too well that nature may unfold in a manner they have not anticipated. If we insist that science should consist of no less than *permanent* truths, then it will cease to be useful to us in dealing with nature. For science then would be blind to those features of reality that tend to throw doubt on its presumed truths.

We can say the same thing of a "closed" ideology. Instead of guiding man in his effort to deal creatively with social reality, such an ideology leads him to see only those things that are consistent with the truths it takes for granted. The defect of some ideologies lies precisely in that they have ceased to be theories of social reality. They have become dogmas or creeds. They have become instruments to keep people in submission or to sustain their passion for a future that may in fact be unattainable.



If an ideology is to be scientific, in the true sense of the word, it must be an "open" ideology. It must allow room for modification and growth and, thus, be able to cope with novel contingencies. Social reality is much more complex than physical reality, for social reality, at bottom, is made up of individual men, each with his own peculiar rationality. This is perhaps the reason why scholars find it hard to point to dramatic advances in the social sciences. The material for social science does not lend itself as easily to prediction and control as does physical reality.

Weak-minded people are attracted to closed ideologies, for they are easily intimidated by new and puzzling features in the world they live in. A closed ideology tidies up this world for them; it arranges things in a manner they can easily understand. But what such people gain in simplicity is no more than a false sense of security. Sooner or later, their simple structures will give way. Reality will assert itself for what it is and not what their ideology says it *ought* to be.

Much of the uneasiness that people have with ideology stems from their failure to understand what ideology is all about. This is not so strange, for even those scholars who spend all their time studying ideology disagree on its essential characteristics. Some people tend to emphasize the passion that goes with an individual's commitment to an ideology. Others think of ideology as being no more than propaganda or slogans, whose validity depends entirely on its efficacy in moving men to action. Still other people think of ideology as necessarily revolutionary. Our ambivalent attitude towards ideology in effect paralyzes our mind and will. For while we accept that an ideology should provide us the framework within which we could unify our acts, we retreat from it—for fear that ideology would commit us to programs opposed to our inclinations as reasonable men.



In a country such as the Philippines, where people have seen the face of war and violence, we often interpret any talk of ideology as an invitation to a bloody confrontation with the ruling class—which ideology often represents as the incorrigible oppressors of the people. This is the most likely reason why ideological thinking has failed to make any headway in Filipino society. Then also, whenever we look for examples of ideology, we are drawn to examine the existing ideologies of conflict—those that regard social development as essentially dialectical. Much could perhaps be said in favor of dialectics as an analytical framework. But when this theory brings us to see reality in only one way—in terms of a violent interplay of social forces, which leads unavoidably to a bloody revolution that is represented as an irrevocable pattern of nature, and so removed from all moral considerations—the dialectical frame reveals itself merely as an instrument to beguile the unwary into taking up arms against his government—merely to install another breed of oppressors to power.

What we need to do, then, is to *demystify* ideology—to see it for what it is, shorn of its obscurantist baggage and mystical garb. In the end, an ideology must be something useful, something that would enable us to deal with social reality in an efficient and rational manner. Such an ideology should be an open one. It must allow for modifications that conform to the changing patterns of social reality.

### **Nature And Function Of Ideology**

What are the essential features of an ideology? Practically all ideologies have the following major components:

- 1) A commitment to a set of fundamental values;
- 2) A theory of society;
- 3) A concept of an alternative future;



4) A program of action.

All other features often identified with ideology are really functions of these four components.

### On Fundamental Values

Concerning values, it is useful to distinguish between what are called *universal* values and *particular* or culture-specific values. Universal values are those presumed to be valid or acceptable to all men, insofar as they share human wants and needs. Particular values are those that arise from a society's unique history, geography or culture.

Values represent a man's aspirations for himself, his society and the world in general. The debate between the pragmatist and the absolutist turns on whether what are called universal values are to be further justified. To the absolutist, such values as social justice, freedom and equality stand as first principles of all human society. They justify themselves because they proceed from our intrinsic nature. To the pragmatist, these values need to be justified; and their justification rests on the social system that promotes these values. For the pragmatist, the point is not in the values themselves, but in the meaning they have in man's life.

Strangely enough, ideologies which stand in opposition to one another converge towards the same set of values: that is, freedom, liberty, equality, democracy, and so forth. This convergence means either of two things: (a) These ideologies agree on what the goals of a human society should be, but differ on the method of achieving these goals; (b) They do not agree on the nature of these values: while using the same terms, they do not attach the same meanings to them.

This convergence of ideologies in the ethical realm suggests that human societies are held together by common aspirations. The universality of certain values makes up



an important premise for ideologies that seek global acceptance.

In addition to values which are universal, an ideology may or, better still, *must*, incorporate within its framework those values indigenous to the client society. This is absolutely essential if the ideology is to become credible and so gain the assent and support of the people. We see here why no external ideology can be imposed on a people. Either the people will resist the system that makes the imposition or the ideology suffers from modification, as demanded by the recipient culture.

The ideologues who tried to sow the seeds of Communism among our people made this mistake. They failed to realize that the underlying values of Marxism-Leninism clash with the prevailing values of Filipino culture. Even the vaunted libertarian ideology of American democracy failed to take strong roots in our country because its values are alien to the basic aspirations of the poor and dispossessed in Filipino society. The American libertarian ideals were credible only to a small sector of the national community: the economic and intellectual elite.

Our values are communal and other-centered, hardly ever personalist. For us the cult of selfishness does not apply because success, for example, is always shared. One's success is his family's success and his community's pride. To take another example, one's shame extends to his family, is borne by all of his kin.

This communal, other-centered perspective in our value system is the democratic revolution's great source of strength. The egalitarian thrust of the democratic revolution is, in the final analysis, essentially communal and other-centered. To establish an egalitarian society, which is the democratic revolution's vision of the future,



is therefore not a Utopian dream. It hinges upon harnessing the Filipino's communal, other-centered value system and making it serve the ends of the democratic revolution.

Our values are those positive aspects of our experiences as a nation which we have incorporated into the mainstream of our social life. To the degree that they are needed in the restructuring of society for the planned future of the people, these aspects of culture, philosophy, arts, religion, economics, and psychology are harmonized into one way of life. These values, however, are effective only when internalized, that is, made a part of consciousness of the people. That is why our democratic revolution will succeed only when it is internalized. It is not incumbent on the part of the leaders alone to accomplish this; but it is also the obligation of the citizenry to participate in the manner they are best qualified. Internationalization of the democratic revolution starts at the base of the nation—with the common people—inspiring and compelling those in the upper ranks to go likewise, so that a symbolic relationship, as it were, occurs between the various levels of society, making the task of nation-building truly a national concern.

Our vision of the future is based on an ideology that is pragmatic, nationalistic, and imbued with consciousness of our heritage. It is a vision that takes into account the various aspects of our history so that past mistakes can be avoided and a benevolent set of priorities for progress can be realized. It is not a paradisiacal future, but one which, considering the multifarious crises besieging the world at present offers a great degree of comfort for the people and encourages them to explore and grow in the context of our economic and physical limitations. It is a future that will allow the people to exercise their creativity in confronting their problems. For, ultimately, it is this creativity that will be the essence of the national technique we will employ to achieve progress.



### Theory Of Society

Just as we must distinguish between universal and particular values, so must we differentiate a theory of society that is universal in scope from one restricted to a *particular* society and its institutions. Ideological thinking leads unavoidably to the attempt to formulate an encompassing theory of society. Again, the Marxist theory of social development, embodied in its theory of historical materialism, gives us an example of such a universalistic theory.

Nothing is intrinsically wrong with an effort to formulate a general theory of society. The problem is that the more general a theory is, the more vulnerable it becomes to exceptions in experience. Thus many theories of this type are fated to become truisms. At any rate, it is dangerous to begin one's study of a society by assuming the validity of some general theory—as some ideologues often do, being more concerned with espousing a dogma than with understanding the social process. The less perilous route is for us to proceed inductively, to use a general theory merely as a working hypothesis that we can subsequently verify by experience.

Recourse to experience is the sternest test, for in the final analysis, no theory is true. At best, a theory is a *tentative* way of viewing reality—a world-view which could be supplanted by another, as soon as novel experiences are encountered which the theory cannot adequately explain.

### Concept Of The Future

The third essential component of ideology is its concept of an alternative future, or the final goal towards which all programs of social reform are directed. Needless to say, such an idea of an alternative future must rest



on our adequate understanding of the past and our correct assessment of the present conditions of our society.

Future viewing, or futuristics, has recently drawn the attention of social scientists. This study is fast becoming a legitimate discipline of social science. Futuristics is not mere prophecy. Neither is it merely prediction based on available data; for if it were a strictly predictive enterprise, it would lack the characteristic level of certainty one finds in the more rigorous disciplines like the physical sciences. In the social sphere, a prophecy or prediction becomes itself part of the casual chain that can alter the behavior of men. In the context of ideological exercise, future-viewing cannot be divorced from prescription or from the viewer's idea of what society ought to be.

Futuristics however, is more scientific than Utopianism. The latter postulates an ideal future for a society, without regard for that society's capability to achieve that future. This ideal future may have a seductive appeal, particularly to those people acutely aware of the frustrations of the present. But unless this ideal future is spelt out in some detail—and this should include a clear assessment of what it takes to achieve this future—what we really have is no more than a Utopian schema floating about in a vacuum. Again, some existing ideologies postulate an alternative future, although in a manner that cannot be useful for systematic and rational planning. I shall say more about this in succeeding chapters. For the moment, I merely wish to underscore the fact that the concept of an alternative future is absolutely essential to an ideology. For with this concept, one could more easily assess the present in relation to the future, and determine the direction and quality of change required to achieve it. We may, of course, distinguish between the *intermediate* future, and the *ultimate* future (the ideal society) towards which reforms are directed. Obviously, the latter is more appealing to those who suffer oppression



today. The passion usually associated with ideology comes from this intense expectation of the ultimate future. What ideology often underplays or altogether misses out are the sacrifices, the self-denial, needed to reach that ideal future.

### **A Program Of Action**

If one were merely to predict what would happen, given certain conditions in a society (which, incidentally, is all that some social scientists are inclined to do), then there is nothing in this prediction that can be said to be ideological. The prediction may be scientific in the standard sense of the term, particularly as it does not commit itself to what ought to be done. But an ideology, as we said, goes beyond predictions of this type. An ideology may predict that given certain contingencies today, another set of contingencies will follow. But insofar as an ideology has a conception of a *better* or a more desirable future, then the ideology must indicate what ought to be done to alter the direction of the present.

In this way, an ideology commits itself to a certain program of action. Far from being neutral with respect to the transformation of events, it becomes "committed": It chooses certain courses of action. This program is the practical direction of the ideology's concept of the desirable future.

So we see how all the four elements of an ideology interlock. Together they form a system. Our values affect our theory of society, just as our theory of society and our values affect our concept of the future and our program of action.

It is probably because of this interweaving of values and theory that those who regard themselves as scientists scorn ideological thinking. This is unfortunate, since these "social scientists" become irrelevant to those who



would like to reform society. The reformists are left to their own devices. 'Scientific' studies of social processes become useless to them, because these studies are not predicated on a moral or ideological standpoint.

We in the Philippines have a few social scientists who view the social process from the ideological standpoint. But their work is still largely useless, since they proceed from a borrowed ideology, which has only a remote connection to our material and historical conditions. Being essentially academicians, these social scientists are unable to grapple with our social reality on our own terms.







## CHAPTER TWO

### THE EGALITARIAN IDEAL

FROM THE standpoint of ideology, values represent the aspirations of a people. This means that the values to which an ideology commits itself must stand in opposition to certain unwanted features in the social reality.

For us, the egalitarian ideal, which is really the basis of the aspiration towards social justice, is primordial. This is understandable, since Philippine society, from the beginning of Spanish colonization to the present, has so generated institutionalized inequities that most poor people take inequality as though it were natural, something that heaven has legislated.

The egalitarian ideal does not imply that all men are in fact equal in every way. Essentially, the egalitarian ideal has a prescriptive, not a descriptive, importance. It urges those persons who occupy positions of power and responsibility—in government or the private sector—to treat equally every individual in the society. In short, the



egalitarian ideal provides the moral basis for public and private transactions.

Needless to say, the egalitarian ideal has a related presupposition about the nature of man. It assumes that each human being (disallowing individuals with natural or congenital disabilities) has the same potential as another to develop himself, and thus to achieve the full measure of his humanity. What prevents a man from achieving his full potential is precisely an institutional arrangement that denies him, but not others, those opportunities that would enable him to realize himself.

Obviously, the egalitarian ideal cannot stand by itself. It needs additional support, for the principle of equality can be met even without bothering with certain other values that are among the basic entitlements of every human being. For instance, we can all be equal in degradation and poverty: but such equality is meaningless. This is why the commitment to an egalitarian polity should rest upon the broader ideal of humanism.

The humanistic credo places man at the center of all things. In the language of Immanuel Kant, it views man never as a means but always as an end in himself. To serve the ends of man—that is the ultimate justification of all social institutions.

The Western philosophical tradition locates man's uniqueness in his rationality: it defines man as a rational animal. This idea of man does not necessarily lead to the philosophy of humanism, for the concept of rationality could be construed mechanistically: as a movement of thought that follows a set of inflexible principles. The Cartesian conception of reason is mechanistic in this sense. For it regards thinking as something that can be pursued only in one way: beginning with clear and distinct notions, the mind moves forward, step by step, following only the



dictates of logic. What Cartesianism overlooks is that element of creativity so essential to the concept of human rationality. The recognition of man's creativity, or that impulse to create new forms and new modes of coping with the demands of reality, has tremendous implications—not only for a philosophy of man but also for social policy and, thus, for ideology.

In a sense, we can regard the history of civilization as the history of human creativity. The so-called scientific revolutions represent man's disengagement from traditional modes of thinking. The development of social institutions reflects all too clearly man's effort to respond to challenges—where these challenges carry with them their own uniqueness, rendering old ways inadequate for dealing with new realities.

The humanistic thrust of our ideology precisely takes into account the fact that apart from being rational, in the Cartesian sense of the term, man has a gift of creativity that expresses itself not only in his art but also in his science and social institutions. This creativity is what makes man truly human. In fact, it seems more appropriate to define man *not* as a rational animal but as a creative being.

The humanistic principle directs our egalitarian commitment. We are not seeking to equalize opportunities for our people merely for the sake of abstract equality. We are doing so to unleash the creative potential of every Filipino.

Talk about humanism brings to mind a cluster of values that come under the umbrella of democratic ideals: "human rights." No ideology can serve as a basis of social transformation unless it commits itself to the rights of man.

It is unfortunate, though perfectly understandable, that in the context of our political experience the concern



for human rights has always been a concern for "political" rights: the right to free speech, of assembly, and so on. Observers of our political process will, no doubt, suppose that for our people political rights are primordial. A review of our political history immediately suggests this. Our difficulties had been in the main induced by an oppressive bureaucracy. What could be more natural than for Filipinos to be particularly conscious of the bureaucracy, and to ensure that it does not go beyond the legitimate boundaries, once again to become an instrument of oppression?

A question that relates to this is whether *in fact* our people are as much concerned with political rights as those who have made it their business to profess them. Is it possible that the question of political rights looms large only in the minds of a small sector of the national community—those who use the issue of political rights for purposes of gaining political power—but that for the masses of Filipinos themselves, the primordial concern is the economic right to survive with dignity?

I do not suggest that human rights lend themselves to stratification in the order of priority. Human rights are better seen in the model of a mutually sustaining system, each necessary to the other. The so-called economic rights cannot be achieved without political rights, just as both the economic and political rights cannot be achieved without the relevant set of procedural rights.

But certainly it is wrong to emphasize just one cluster of rights to the neglect of another equally important cluster. To emphasize political rights at the expense of economic rights is to forego these very conditions that would make the exercise of political rights meaningful. This point has been adequately stressed by writers on human rights, in their insistence that the enjoyment of political rights presupposes a set of enabling conditions: the right



of free speech is meaningful only for the literate and the well-informed, just as the right to travel is meaningful only to those who have the means to travel. A certain cluster of economic rights is in essence, enabling conditions for other rights; just as a cluster of political rights are essential to the promotion and maintainance of economic rights.

To the majority of our people, to whom the question of survival is a day-to-day problem, economic rights come before any other set of rights. This does not mean that they are willing to trade off basic political rights for the right to food, clothing and shelter. This only means that what dominates their consciousness are matters intimately bound up with survival.

Our people's alienation from the political process is rooted in their perception that our political institutions are largely irrelevant to their basic aspirations. Our introduction to the bureaucracy within the framework of the democratic ideals began under the American tutelage at the turn of the century. However, the direction which our democratization took was not towards meeting the needs and aspirations of the people—the poor—but towards providing those who are already well-placed the moral arguments for their continuance in power. The Filipino economic and intellectual elite whom the Americans mobilized for their pacification campaign presented themselves as the champion of Filipino democratic rights. Quite understandably, the rights they emphasized were those which they themselves could do without. In championing political rights, they were principally concerned with power, and not the welfare of those for whom the democratic ideals are specially relevant. To be sure, the Filipino masses themselves took part in the political process. But this participation, as everyone knows, did not derive from their consciousness that political rights are



*per se* important, but from the practical hope that a change in leadership would mean a change in their economic status.

In our experience, the successive change in political leadership led to anything but an improvement in the lives of the people. The benefits from these changes, if any, were appropriated by the economic and intellectual elite. Through the years, the cleavage between the interest of the many and the few became wider. The poor looked to the periodic elections merely as opportunities to gain small favors from the politicians—a few pesos with which to buy their needs—or else occasions for entertainment and a respite from drugery. To the Filipino poor, government might have ceased being an institution of oppression, which it had been during the Spanish times. But, certainly, it was still unconcerned with them and their economic conditions.

One feels that even such a radical political decision as the declaration of martial law did not intimidate the Filipino poor, since they regarded it as merely another of those “political upheavals” that would in no way affect their lives. As far as they were concerned, the declaration of martial law was an internal affair—an issue to be settled by the politicians. For them, the only dramatic change initially wrought by martial law was the radical improvement in peace and order, which, incidentally, is something they had fervently wished for.

The opposition to martial law came from the Filipino oligarchy, which sensed belatedly that behind the martial law government's effort to quell a rebellion was the resolve to reorganize the whole national society so that wealth and opportunities could be more equitably distributed. Allied with the oligarchy was the intellectual elite, itself oriented to power, who saw in martial law the diminution



of its sphere of influence. The Americans themselves worried a great deal about martial law, for to them, it represented a break from the democratic tradition. But what has not been properly emphasized is that the so-called democratic ideals are not exhausted in the political process; that in addition to those political rights, which the democratic tradition is known to uphold, economic rights deserve as much, if not more, attention by the government.

The challenge to the political leadership in this country is not simply to achieve and maintain an authentic democratic process which rests on such ideals as freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, etc., but to establish, first of all, the credibility of government as an institution oriented to working for the welfare of the many and not just the few. The credibility of government does not turn on our having periodic elections, not on the working of an uninhibited press, but on what the government means to the people. The credibility of government is determined by the jobs and opportunities, such as education and social services, that it makes available to the poor.

A government that seeks to establish its credibility by being relevant to the lives of the majority can be wrongly judged as having broken off from the traditional democratic ideals, when in fact it places itself squarely behind these ideals. This is not to trade off one set of ideals for another but to emphasize one, as dictated by the real aspirations of the people, without denying the other.

What many tend to forget is that for an authentic democracy to be operative certain conditions must be met. The advocates of political liberties will have nothing to go by if the people are in no position to exercise those political liberties. The very possibility, therefore, of a democratic system is what we have to establish if we are to align ourselves with democracy's libertarian ethics.



The failure of democracy in this country proceeded from a wrong assessment of the people's perception of their problems. The demand for political liberties is essentially a demand against the bureaucracy by a few—those whose system of expectations includes the possibility of their getting to positions of power. Even if one argued for a tie between political liberties and the economic conditions of the people, those who managed to gain political power failed to honor their commitment to improve the lot of the people. In other words, political power becomes an end in itself, and not, as the democratic theory would have it, a means to an end.

What is clearly perceptible in our political culture is the attachment to power. There is a tendency to consider bureaucratic positions as indicators of one's personal achievement and not as something that implies greater challenge to one's dedication and abilities.

In a sense, this attachment to power as an end in itself reflects our frustrations, or more exactly, the frustrations of those who believe that they have the gift and the ability to exercise power. It could also reflect our essential orientation to authority, an outgrowth of the conditions of poverty and the consequent sense of security we derive from being in a group. The individualist credo celebrated in the American democratic theory presupposes that the individual perceives and asserts his identity and demands that this identity be respected by others, particularly by the political institutions. Its essential condition is the individual's confidence that by himself he could cope with the challenges of his environment. Unless regulated, this type of individualism could lead to radical anarchism, a rejection of any and every authority figure or system.

The confidence of the individual to handle the contingencies in his environment could be merely psychological, but as a rule, it is indicative of the nature of the socio-



economic milieu within which he lives. Such a milieu must provide him, in real terms, the means with which to cope with his own problems. If in fact such means is given him, he could, alone, feel quite insecure, and he would tend to find security in a group and subject himself to the authority of its leadership. The inclination of one, therefore, to authority and thus to denial of his individuality is a result of poverty. Poverty intimidates those without the means for self-reliance and drives them to think more in terms of collective rather than individual good.

From this emerges a contradiction between the individualism promoted by the libertarian tradition and the individual inclination toward collectivism which is caused by the sense of insecurity in turn spawned by conditions of poverty. The effort to instruct us in the rudiments of the democratic traditions was handicapped by its own failure to create institutions that would enable every Filipino to develop confidence in himself as an individual and as a person. A great deal of emphasis was placed on political liberties and hardly anything on survival. One does not wonder, then, why all talk about political rights hardly moves the poor: the element that would make political rights meaningful is absent. The issue of political rights is significant only for the well entrenched few—the oligarchy and the intellectual elite who have played the role of power broker in our political culture.

What needs to be done, if we are to attempt seriously to establish an authentic democracy—one that presumes awareness of the individual's own identity and confidence in his capacity to deal with the contingencies in his environment—is to create the institutions and the milieu that would make the exercise of political liberties the privilege not only of the few but of all. The development of a society with an egalitarian base should become the principal preoccupation of the leadership. This is not, we repeat,



to be unfaithful to the democratic tradition. It is, on the contrary, to be truly committed to it. Political liberties cannot exist in vacuum. They must be rooted in a socio-economic reality that provides the condition for their full development.



### CHAPTER THREE

## REVOLUTION FROM THE CENTER

THE ESSENTIAL idea of revolution is radical change and *not*, as some people mistakenly believe, the violent confrontation of two national groups having irreconcilable interests. This point needs to be stressed, because the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972 did not merely constitute a legitimate exercise of the government's power to defend itself against those seeking to undermine it. Martial law also inaugurated an effort to radicalize Philippine society, so that it may respond to the needs of all and not just a few.

Insofar as we are committed to a program of radicalization—which, at bottom, involves the total reorientation of the instrumentalities of government and other institutions of society—we are engaged in a revolution.

There are those who continue to believe that the revolution to which we have committed ourselves cannot be an authentic revolution. For there is no armed confrontation between the so-called wielders of power,



equated, as a rule, with the government, and any group that conducts itself in the name of the people. Besides, this revolution is a process initiated by the government itself. Isn't a revolution always directed against a government?

Let us review once again the theoretical underpinnings of what we referred to in an earlier work as the Jacobin revolution, which regards an armed confrontation between the government and the people as essential to the idea of revolution.

Putting aside revolutionary adventurism—to which the question of an ideological concept of revolution is largely irrelevant—the idea that a revolution is a contest for power between people and government presupposes a broader theory of society: one that considers opposition between interest-groups to be essential to social development.

To be more specific, this general theory of revolution teaches that under certain types of economy—for example, under capitalism—the general tendency is for wealth and power to become concentrated in the hands of the few (the so-called owners of production) at the expense of the many (the working class). There is no way these two classes could be reconciled to form a relationship of mutual advantage—because the interest of the owners of production is diametrically opposed to the interest of the working class. The unavoidable result of this conflict of interests is revolution.

Up to a point, this general theory seems acceptable—except that the question of stratifying society into classes often depends on one's point of view and the purposes for which stratification is made. How many social classes are there in a society? Shall we think only in terms of the rich and the poor? Or shall we think in terms of upper, middle and lower classes? Shall we think



in terms of distinct economic groups—for instance, factory hands, agricultural workers, fishermen, big and small landowners, workers of government and private industry, and so forth? How about the poor who have no jobs? Housewives? Children? Intellectuals? Artists? Religious workers? To put all these groups under the broad category of working class, in direct opposition to the owners of production, is to commit the error of oversimplification.

One might argue that the stratification of society into two classes—the working class versus the owners of production—is essentially a stratification of power. But even this argument is questionable, because it excludes from the equation the government, itself the repository of considerable power.

Here we meet a crucial turn in the argument for Jacobin revolution. For the Jacobin theory does not regard government as an *autonomous* entity. Government may begin as an autonomous entity, Jacobins concede, but in due course the powers of government are appropriated by the owners of production. This argument is not so much empirical as *a priori*. Under any circumstances, given the nature of the capitalist economy, the powers of government are sooner or later taken over by the rich. Hence government, identifying itself with the owners of production, acts only in ways that increase the misery of the poor. Given this postulate, which denies government its autonomy, the only alternative left for the poor—the working class—is to take over the reins of government, to set themselves up as the state power, and then to reconstitute the entire social system. Essentially, this is the conception of the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat.

As a rallying point of Jacobin revolution, the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat appears to have a lot



going for itself. For it promises the poor a way of immediately transcending their wretched condition. But this idea leaves open the question of how such a proletarian dictatorship—which, as the term suggests, entails the unrestricted exercise of raw power—would transform itself into a more noble and more humane agency, once the bourgeoisie has been swept away. The reality of power politics teaches us that those who ascend to important positions in the name of the people are seldom inclined to relinquish the power they have gained from the revolutionary struggle. Though the people may find themselves with the vague ideal of a classless society, the proletarian state refuses to wither away. In the end, the Jacobin revolution is an elaborate political swindle that leaves the people no better than they were.

The concept of an autonomous government—one able to exert its own will—is central to our theory of democratic revolution. Even if, for the sake of argument, we single out only two major power groups—the rich and the poor—in national society, government is the third entity whose role we cannot ignore. The Jacobin view, of course, suggests that the government has no separate identity, since, for all practical purposes, it is party to a grand conspiracy of the rich against the poor. In becoming an ally of the owners of production, government therefore ceases to have an identity of its own. For us Filipinos, this was more than just a theoretical possibility. We all remember when government came perilously close under oligarchic control.

The other possibility, which theoreticians of social development seldom see, is an alliance between government and the poor. An essential presupposition here is government's awakening to the awareness that much of its power has been taken over by a small, but powerful, segment of society. Responding to the moral imperative that its only justification for existence is to serve the in-



terest of all, such an awakened government may take the initiative to free itself from the grip of the oligarchy and to secure its autonomy. Again, this is not just another theoretical possibility for Filipinos. It is at the heart of our own democratic revolution.

Note, however, that our democratic revolution is not exactly the same as that which seeks to transfer power from one sector of society to another—that is, to disenfranchise the rich and install the poor to power. Our theory requires the existence of a legitimate government that will not favor one and injure the other. Our theory requires a conscientious government that will preside over the interaction between the rich and the poor, or among the various sectors of society, in the spirit of justice and fair play. This is really what government autonomy means.

Our commitment to a free enterprise economy becomes all the more credible because we do not conceive of a social arrangement where government takes over the means of production—as suggested by some traditional *isms*. Instead, we conceive of a social arrangement where government is guardian and implementor of those policies that seek to equalize opportunities among the people as a whole.

We shall continue to adhere to a free enterprise economy, where the private sector shall remain our principal engine for economic growth and prosperity. We assert that only through the creative imagination of private initiative can the full flowering of economic development be achieved. Government will interfere only in those areas of economic activity where great risks are involved or private resources are inadequate to meet the demands for greater productivity. In this balancing of private entrepreneurship and government support lies the key to a dynamic and healthy economy.



The concept of self-reliance must, and should, be the framework of our policy towards national survival. In simple terms, this means that the primary and fundamental task of ensuring our national well-being and dignity in the community of nations remains our sole responsibility. Toward this end, we seek understanding and friendship with all nations irrespective of race, color, or ideology. We shall refuse to be pawns in the quarrels of the strong. We will never allow foreign intervention in the solution of our internal problems; to do so would be violative of our national sovereignty so sacred to our people. We shall continue to support the United Nations in the firm conviction that this world organization remains our only hope for international peace.

Our democratic institutions can only be strengthened by genuine participation of all sectors of our society. We must continue to provide the positive mechanism towards this ideal. Mass participation will ensure the accommodation and subsequent resolution of conflicting demands, creating thereby a healthy consensus among our people. Mass participation and mass mobilization will crystallize the enduring aspirations of our people.

The vigorous search for alternative sources of energy is a compelling necessity. The unabated increases in the price of oil in the world market is a serious threat to our steady economic growth. Our rich coal reserves as well as our potential geothermal power must now be tapped and explored to augment our other sources of energy supply. Above all, our people must now be alert to the demands of energy conservation. Wasteful consumption of oil and wanton disregard for energy conservation measures is a crime against national survival.

The cultural advancement of our nation more than its material progress deserves equally great attention and concern. We must equip our citizenry with a counter-



consciousness capable of transcending their intellectual and moral limitations. We must begin our search for national identity and strength inherent in our character and heritage as a people to enable us to confront our future with confidence and maturity. The search for our historical past and a concrete formulation of our vision for the future must be an on-going task both by the political leadership and the national community.

It is easy enough to misconstrue the intentions of government, particularly in a society such as ours, where the oligarchy has for many years appropriated the bounties of society, and where the poor had lived in abject misery. Guided by a sense of justice and fair play, government cannot but look after the interest of the poor, to provide them the opportunities denied them through the years. This is a part of the demand of egalitarianism. Yet there is nothing in such a conception that seeks to establish a dictatorship of any form.

We have characterized the democratic revolution as a "revolution from the center," because it is revolution initiated by the government, which stands at the center of society and not above the people. Ours is a revolution neither from the left nor the right, neither from above nor below: but a revolution or, better still, a radicalization of existing social arrangements, initiated not simply by a duly constituted authority but by the only authority morally bound to act in behalf of the people.

What prevents some people from properly assessing our political reality is their inclination to purify or elevate the idea of Government—i.e., to think that there is an entity one calls Government, over and above the individuals who occupy positions of power and responsibility. If we think in terms of individuals and not in terms of a theoretical fiction, an abstract entity, we shall realize the idea of autonomous political leadership—more



particularly, of individuals who act from the imperative that they are to discharge their function not for the benefit of one sector of the society but for all. The belief that, in a capitalistic economy, government sooner or later becomes captive of the owners of production translates into the situation where the owners of production themselves manage to gain political power, or coopt—buy off—those persons who occupy positions of public power.

Our own political development seems to have closely followed this path—with a variation. Instead of our having, at the beginning, a government or leadership initially oriented to the people but gradually falling under oligarchic control, our experience in democracy really began with the oligarchy already in power.

Colonial rule saw the rise of a sector of the national community that allied itself with Spanish political power. As might be expected, this alliance was one of convenience. In their effort to subdue the Filipinos, the conquistadores identified and installed to power those Filipinos who already had some measure of control over the population. These were usually the *datus* and other influential or affluent members of preconquest society. This *principalia* formed the core of the Filipino oligarchy, some of whose members made their way to the colonial bureaucracy or became agents of Spanish authority. Spanish colonial government was anything but democratic, for its primordial interest was to deliver to the Spanish crown the bounties of the Philippines.

The coming of the Americans is often represented as the beginning of our political democratization; but this is more fancy than fact. The Americans first set up a military government that had to worry initially about Filipino armed resistance. This armed resistance carried over the Filipino revolution against Spanish rule. Like their colonial predecessor, the Americans found it



convenient to ally themselves with the prevailing power structure—the Filipino oligarchy. In an important sense, therefore, the Americans legitimized the power of this oligarchy.

They did not, as the standard images of democracy claim, begin by opening public office to competition. Rather, the Americans initially favored certain personalities and interest groups to hold public office, so that they may more easily pacify the archipelago. It is, therefore, wrong to think that our democratic institutions, especially government, gradually developed into an instrument to favor the few. The true picture was really worse than this. For, through the years, government has always been almost completely under the control of the oligarchy. And both the Spanish and the American colonial governments promoted and reinforced this arrangement.

Throughout the Commonwealth years, the pragmatic demands of colonial administration determined to a large extent our exercise in democratic politicalization. Briefly interrupted by the Second World War, our effort continued towards establishing a democratic government. Unfortunately, democracy to us, meant merely a competitive struggle for political power, because it gave the electorate the semblance of participation in choosing national leaders.

Given the nature of our political life, where the oligarchy was in collusion with the colonial power, one would expect the people to become restless and to rise in arms against government. To be sure, there were pockets of endemic popular rebellion throughout the colonial period, whose ultimate objective was to transform the government into an authentic rule of the people. But these pockets of rebellion were easily contained. In more recent times, some revolutionary adventurers, hoping to take over the government's power for themselves, sought to



mobilize the people in violent action against it. But they failed, mainly because they were mistaken in their assessment of popular inclinations. They spoke a language that did not articulate the people's aspirations. They pursued the revolutionary demands in accordance with foreign ideologies that did not relate to the people's consciousness. But the government had to meet their activities, for they were acting not on their own but with the support of external powers interested in extending their influence over the country.

In the light of our political realities, there cannot be any revolution in this country outside of one waged by the government itself: *the democratic revolution*. For a revolution aimed at overthrowing the government to gain ground, the people, for whom such a revolution is to be waged, must support it. What this requires, among other things, is the people's belief that a change in government—more specifically, a change in political leadership—would have some determinable effect on their lives. But this is precisely what is missing in the premises of our political epistemology. Through the years, the bounties of government never filtered down to the people.

From the Spanish bureaucracy to the Commonwealth period up to the post-war years, government—or better still, the national politicians, conducted themselves in a manner that deepened the cleavage between government and people. "Politics" became a dirty word, connoting political opportunism—a political game played by the economic and intellectual elite. On the other hand, the people—particularly the poor, who constitute more than 70 percent of the population—never thought of themselves as constituting a political force, a distinct class brought together by a shared consciousness of oppression. The closest people came to political consciousness was in their demonstration of loyalty to political leaders. But this



loyalty had no ideological basis. It was always personal, reinforced by the culture of patronage.

In a sense, it would be easy to weld the people together into a single force and develop in them class consciousness. But what militates against this, as far as our people are concerned, is their tribalism, their inclination to preserve and promote regional groupings—an inclination rooted in poverty. What is real is the group led by a personal leader, to whom followers can relate. Government, including the nation, remains abstract entity or at best, an institution that has nothing to do with people's everyday problems.

What we have here is a kind of paradox. For the people to rise in arms against a government, the people must first believe in the efficacy of government. The government must first acquire an ontological reality. The efficacy of government need not be positive. It could be negative. If people see that government, as a system of power relations, is truly oppressive, they will then develop both a consciousness of government and the concept of an alternative system. But Filipinos have not been truly oppressed. More particularly, they have never equated their difficulties with the workings of government, but with the workings of specific personalities. Therefore, they might take up arms against specific persons, but never against a *system*.

Given this reality, there cannot be any genuine class revolution in this country. The only revolution that can alter the distributive mechanism of society is a revolution led by government itself.

What this revolution requires is a political leadership that finds reason to institute radical reforms and, more important, has the courage to act on behalf of the people, and thus against the oligarchy, including its power brokers in the ranks of the intellectual elite. In pur-



suings a democratic revolution—essentially a bloodless restructuring of power relationships in society—the political leadership runs the risk of acting initially without the support of the people. On the other hand, it confronts a well-entrenched power bloc: the oligarchy that has at its command a sophisticated armory of reaction against any government that betrayed the oligarchic interest. The idea of revolution from the center, therefore, becomes an apt description of our state of affairs. For the people themselves, at the stage in which we find ourselves, are at the center: they are neither of the Right nor of the Left. The government stands among them, concerned, among other things, with getting the people to bestir themselves and alter the conditions that had oppressed them for too long and kept them from attaining the dignity that belongs to them.

Fortunately, the framers of the 1973 Constitution perceived this role of government and therefore ordained the present transition to a parliamentary democracy. Needless to say, it is a departure from the old presidential-congressional system, with its infamous stalemates and antagonisms, all of which served to demolish public confidence in government. We are installing in its place a system that we believe could, and should, be a more effective government, one in which the tenure of leadership shall depend not upon the wiles and manipulations of oligarchs and political lords but upon its own performance, upon its ability to justify the people's faith in democratic government.

True it is that in the face of one crisis following another, it is imperative that a government which hopes and desires to fulfill the requirements of survival and growth must rely upon a strong executive to provide leadership and that firm sense of direction which was not one of the best features of the old system. The Philippines, as I have said in an earlier book, is not alone in



learning this lesson. The leader of every Third World nation is faced immediately upon assumption of office with the problems, among others, of security and the choice of an economic ideology. Even if these were all his problems—and they aren't—he will learn, and the whole nation along with him, that only with real authority may he expect to lead an effective government.

In the Philippines, we have made use of this experience in balancing strong authority and the requirements of the public welfare to launch a revolution by government itself, in this way achieving objectives which, in the terrors and tensions of the late '60's and early '70's, rash souls would have tried to attain by violence and bloodshed.







## CHAPTER FOUR

### POPULAR PARTICIPATION

#### **American Precept of Democracy**

THE TYPE of "representative democracy" introduced into the Philippines by the United States found itself in a most inhospitable environment. For it was a political way of life evolved by a people accustomed to freedom and economic self-sufficiency. Except for the black slaves of the South and its cotton plantations, there were no tenants and no haciendas in America. Tribalism had long disappeared from American society. Its territory was vast, with incredible riches, and its people were skilled migrants from Europe. And the "representative democracy" that found formal expression in the American Constitution came from hundreds of years of practice.

In tragic contrast, Philippine society was still imbued with tribalism and regionalism. Except for the few hectic weeks of the Malolos Congress, Filipinos had never experienced either a Congress or a Parliament. We had never elected our national leaders (under Spanish rule, a limited



franchise chose local officials). For hundreds of years, our leaders were either hereditary successors or appointed by the colonial authority. Moreover, economic power was concentrated in a few families; and it is not too great an exaggeration to say that he who had the power to give food also had the power to command votes.

So, "representative democracy" in the Philippines became, soon enough, just another asset of the economic elite. Money became the way to political office; and political office became the way to more money. "What are we in power for?" became the cynical reply to: "Is it wrong for a man to provide for his future?" Vote-buying became the rule. And this is not strange, because so many of our people came to conclude that the money they got for their votes was the only direct gain they would ever receive from "representative democracy."

For politicians, of course, the money spent buying votes became a cost that had to be recovered. It was an investment in the business of acquiring public office. So, vote-buying was repaid by influence-peddling, and corruption became a social cancer, in a society where every man looked out only for himself. The "public interest" became a principle invoked only in campaign oratory.

Of course, there were individual exceptions. They all the more proved the rule that our society had become like a house riddled with termites: though it stood, seemingly solid, its foundations were crumbling. Its collapse was but a matter of time—either from the trappings of those inside it, or from the force of external storms.

In the old society, the principle of equal access to government was largely a sham. The weight of wealth tipped the scales in favor of the elite. Popular participation in politics was largely ceremonial, because, whichever one of the two contending parties people voted to power, they were still confronted by the men of the oligarchy.



For each party was really just a bloc contending for power and its spoils. To be sure, there were outstanding individual exceptions, but the oligarchic majority in each bloc won its way. Moreover, the political victory of each bloc meant a drastic shift in the programming of our scarce national resources. Many were the roads that one party left unfinished, simply because they were *begun* by the *other* party.

Not only was there this periodic shift in the use of national resources. There was usually also a drastic change in government personnel. The end result was the shameful and tragic waste of resources, both material and human. What energy was left in the winning party, after it had fought each bitter contested "election," it could not even devote to the business of government—because the losing party would continue its campaign of obstructionism, vilification, and personal opposition.

In truth, the bitterness of election campaigns never really ended—until politics in our country became one sustained uproar of demagoguery, drowning out the few voices common sense left. Philippine politics was correctly classified as a "politics of conflict" in which everybody lost and no one won. Our masses were losers because they were once more cheated of their expectations, and even the winners were losers because they governed without peace.

Our so-called "representative democracy," already sickly in its alien setting, never became more than the weak manifestation of a noble dream. As an effective medium of our people's aspirations, in fact, "representative democracy" was dying well before the crisis of 1972. It simply could not survive—given a rapacious oligarchy and an electorate, enfeebled by poverty, open to corruption. If "representative democracy" is the best of all political systems, then the factors that distort it must be removed



and the conditions in which it can work must be established in our country.

### **Conditions For Genuine Democracy**

What are the basic conditions for the healthy growth of representative democracy? Clearly, these conditions are a responsible electorate composed of the widest possible number of citizens and responsible political leaders who bear in their hearts the aspirations of the people.

Democracy is the formulation of a national consensus on basic, guiding policies, born of free and responsible discussion. Let us note this phrase well: discussion, not only free, because mere freedom can lead to chaos, but responsible as well.

Taken in the context of our social well-being, a democratic consensus means that our view, our goal, is not what benefits us personally, but what benefits us all. Social responsibility looks beyond selfish interest to the national interest. It may be morally summarized as the complete and happy acceptance of the tenet: "I am my brother's keeper."

### **New Political Institutions**

Thus, to achieve wider and more direct participation of citizens in the affairs of government, we have instituted various reforms in our political system through a number of measures—notably Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A creating the Citizens Assembly and P.D. No. 826 providing for *Sangguniang Bayan* in every province, city and municipality.

We will best appreciate these reforms when we examine them against the background of the old political culture. These reforms represent our efforts to make our political institutions relevant to the needs of our people and



to make Filipinos aware of their duty to take an active part in the affairs of government.

### **The Barangay**

On September 21, 1974, P.D. No. 557 declared all the barrios in the Philippines as barangays. With this Decree the barangays were given status as the basic government unit in national politics. A barangay is a unit made up of from 100 to 500 families. Each barangay is headed by a chairman assisted by a set of officers known as the barangay *pook* leaders. A *pook* is a defined street, block or identifiable compact neighborhood headed by an acknowledged leader. Normally, ten such units compose a barangay.

Barangay membership is open to any person, literate or illiterate, with these qualifications: Filipino citizen; resident of the barangay (formerly barrio area), district, or ward in which he wishes to register, for at least six months before registration; at least 15 years old; duly registered in the barangay list of assembly members kept by the barangay secretary.

The barangay was conceived as a means to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and as a vehicle for expressing the views of the people on national issues. Accorded legal status and due recognition, the barangay assembly constitutes the legitimate and valid expression of the popular will.

The Revised Barrio Charter (now the Barangay Charter) or R.A. No. 3590 and Presidential Decree No. 557 give the Barangay assembly the powers to recommend to the barangay council the adoption of measures for the welfare of the barangay; to decide on the holding of a plebiscite; to act on budgetary and supplemental appropriations and special tax ordinances submitted by the barangay council;



and to hear the annual report of the barangay council on the activities and finances of the assembly.

Aside from these local legislative and consultative powers, the barangay assembly acts as an agency for community action on national government programs; as a medium for plebiscites and referendums and as an instrument through which the state disseminates edicts and regulations to the national community. However, it is the barangay council that acts on assembly recommendations.

The present barangays (Citizens Assemblies), as created under P.D. No. 86 dated September 31, 1972, constitute the base for citizen participation in government. Their collective views are considered in the making of national policies or programs. Whenever practicable, these popular views are translated into concrete and specific decisions.

The barangay aims to be an effective instrument for attaining national solidarity and progress by providing effective popular participation in shaping public policy. Its main goal is to be of service; the barangay is development-oriented.

Specifically, it aims to develop and promote a sanitary and decent environment in the zone neighborhood. It undertakes community beautification projects, helps in the food production campaign; promotes socio-cultural activities; improves inter-group relations and communication between authorities and the zone neighborhood, and fosters closer relations between the police-military authorities and the zone neighborhood. The barangay also helps to prevent, reduce, or eliminate crimes, gangs, intergroup tensions, problems and conflicts; it assists in preventing and detecting drug abusers and pushers and helps in rehabilitating drug victims. It propagates cooperatives to help curb prices, galvanizes community action in emergencies; develops public interest and concern for laws and



ordinances; and maintains an information center and liaison group through which pressing and common problems may be received, studied, attended to, or referred to appropriate authorities.

The Barangay Assembly meets at the call of the barrio captain, the district or ward leader, or at the request of at least one-tenth of all members to consider matters of local or national concern. The quorum for conducting business and taking any official action by the Barangay Assembly is at least one fifth of the members. Proceedings are recorded by the barrio, district or ward secretary or, in his absence, by any member designated as acting secretary by the barrio captain or district or ward leader.

### **The Sangguniang Bayan**

The Sangguniang Bayan gives substance to the national vision of legislative bodies where citizens may legislate for themselves on matters that concern them immediately. It is a milestone in the evolution of a truly Filipino political system. P.D. No. 826 has identified and defined the different types of popular representation that are closest to the needs of our local government system. At present, there are four types of these:

a. *General Representation*—Provincial boards and city/municipal councils, retained under P.D. No. 826, were chosen in the last local elections and so represent the population in local units. They shall continue in office until removed by the President as provided for by the Transitory Provisions, Article XVII, Section 9.

b. *Barangay and Youth Representation*—The community government, the barangay, has been granted representation at the city, municipal and provincial levels. The interests of each neighborhood, as well as those of the youth, are now expressed in every Sangguniang Bayan. In every municipality or city, the barangay chairmen elect



from among themselves as many representatives as they need. And at all local levels, the federation presidents of the barangay, as well as their youth counterparts, are designated members of the Sangguniang Bayan.

c. *Sectoral Representation*—Common-interest groups in cities and municipalities have also been recognized as possessing a rightful share in government affairs. Thus, representatives have been chosen to represent sectoral interests. These are:

1) *Capital*—These are the people who directly fund private business ventures. Generally, they are the controlling owners of business enterprises and establishments, whose income is derived from the residual profits of their investments. This category includes all employers or persons acting in the interest of an employer, such as a supervisor, as these terms are defined by existing labor laws. Also included in this category are landowners who do not themselves till the land.

2) *Professionals*—These are people engaged in a particular field of work which requires a considerable amount of higher education and involves creative rather than manual labor. This category includes doctors, teachers, dentists, lawyers, etc.

3) *Industrial Labor*—These are skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled employees receiving regular salaries or compensation for services performed in the production, distribution and marketing of goods and services; and whose hours of work are regulated or controlled by their employers. This sector includes factory workers, salesmen, waitresses, etc.

4) *Agricultural Labor*—These are workers who earn their livelihood from direct manual and physical labor in the areas of farming in all its branches. Among other things, this sector includes the cultiva-



tion and tilling of the soil; dairying; fishing; the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity; the raising of livestock or poultry and any practice performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations. The sector excludes the manufacturing or processing of sugar, coconut, abaca, tobacco, pineapples or other farm products.

These representatives are selected through a defined process of sectoral organization and election. First, residents of the municipality or city organize themselves, through a resolution submitted to the Governor in the provinces or City Mayor, in the case of cities (or their designated coordinators) into separate association of capitalists, professionals, industrial workers and agricultural laborers, as defined. Second, after recognition of the sectoral group and its members by the Governor, the members of the group elect from among themselves a nominee to the Sangguniang Bayan. The President subsequently appoints such a nominee as the sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Bayan.

d. *Municipal Representation at Provincial Level.*—The pre-P.D. No. 826 provincial boards had the duty of lawmaking on matters affecting the municipalities of the province. Under this system, there was always the danger that the members of the board would write laws without consulting the municipalities concerned. P.D. No. 826 specifically provides for and safeguards the participation of municipal representatives in the provincial body.

There are a number of differences between the old and the new government structures:

First, the Sangguniang Bayan fully recognizes the importance of barangays in the work of lawmaking. Where



such a task was limited to the municipal/city councils and provincial boards, the barangays, through their representatives, now have legislative functions apart from the administrative and consultancy tasks they have exercised in referendums and other government activities at community level.

Second, with the increase in membership of local government bodies through the inclusion of new representatives from the barangays and sectoral interest groups, a broadened and authentic participation by citizens in government affairs has been finally realized.

Third, the Sangguniang Bayan further extends recognition to those interest-groups previously regarded as simple "mass organizations" or "sectoral associations." Today, the Sangguniang Bayan provides a forum for every working capitalist, professional, laborer and farmer. At no other time in our history did they have such a direct and unchallenged representation in legislation.

Finally, the Sangguniang Bayan emphasizes its function as a forum for representation rather than, as in the old days, its local lawmaking functions alone.

Members of pre-P.D. No. 826 provincial boards and city/municipal councils were elected at large; thus it was difficult to define what interests they represented from among the conglomeration of sectors and groups present in a political unit. Because P.D. No. 826 identifies specific groups of interest in a typical local unit, it becomes imperative to give these groups distinct and explicit expression in the Sangguniang Bayan. No longer are groupings of capitalists, professionals, industrial laborers and farmers considered mere associations. Now they are components of our new system of popular representation.

One of the highlights of this novel political systems is the forging of structures by which the efforts of local le-



gislative bodies may be coordinated into a whole. This is made possible by P.D. No. 925 providing for a grouping called *Pampook na Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian* in every administrative region.

A federation of Sangguniang Bayan units within a particular region, the Pampook na Katipunan was organized to provide a forum for discussing issues that are of common regional significance. Thus, the Pampook na Katipunan gives Sangguniang Bayans a unified direction.

On January 21, 1976, P.D. No. 877 organized the *Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian* on the national level. This organization was called for by the practical need for Sangguniang Bayan members throughout the country to convene regularly and collectively to deliberate on issues of local and national significance, as well as matters of common importance to Sangguniang Bayan members.

### **The Batasang Bayan**

The citizens assembly (now the Barangay) and the Sangguniang Bayan paved the way for the Batasang Bayan. Article XVII of the Constitution provides for an interim National Assembly to act as the temporary legislative body until the establishment of a regular National Assembly. In the referendums of July 27, 1973 and February 17, 1975, the people voted against convening the interim National Assembly. However, the electorate, through its Barangays and Sanggunians, expressed their desire for a legislative advisory body to help the President exercise his lawmaking functions, pending the establishment of a Legislative Assembly. So a Legislative Advisory Council, known as the Batasang Bayan, was created by P.D. No. 995.

The Batasang Bayan is composed of the President; members of the Cabinet, including officials with Cabinet rank; members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap, as deter-



mined under P.D. No. 925 (Organizing the Pampook na Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian) and such other members as may, from time to time, be appointed by the President.

The members of the Batasang Bayan hold office while they are members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap or the Cabinet, or at the pleasure of the President if they are from the private sector.

The Batasang Bayan works as the President's advisory body on legislative matters. Its powers and functions consist of, but are not limited to:

- a. Assisting and advising the President on his lawmaking functions;
- b. Providing a forum for citizens, through designated representatives, to air their views on national issues, as well as their opinions on the manner of administering the affairs of government;
- c. Providing a forum for rationalizing, unifying, and clarifying the policies and programs of the Executive Branch;
- d. Providing the mechanism for conducting a review of the structures, policies and efficiencies of the different Barangays and Sanggunians and submitting its findings and recommendations to the President.

### **The Interim Batasang Pambansa**

The 1973 Constitution created an Interim National Assembly which was to work as the legislative body during the transition from crisis to normal government. Its powers are similar to those of the regular National Assembly. However, the 1976 constitutional amendments created a body that superseded the Interim National Assembly. This is the Interim Batasang Pambansa, which has the same powers and functions as the Interim National As-



sembly (INA) and the regular National Assembly, although with some minor qualifications:

a. Its composition is different from the INA in accordance with the first amendment to the 1973 Constitution;

b. It has no share in the treaty-making power (Art. VIII, Sec. 14 (1), 1973 Constitution) as provided for by the second amendment;

c. It cannot elect the President and Prime Minister because of the third amendment;

d. It cannot impeach the President nor withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister, not only because of the third amendment, but because of the referendums of January 17, 1973; January 30, 1973; July 27-28, 1973; and February 27-28, 1975, and the referendum plebiscite of October 16-17, by which the incumbent President was empowered to continue as incumbent President beyond 1973, to be President/Prime Minister at the same time, and, pursuant to the fifth amendment, "to continue to exercise legislative powers until Martial Law shall have been lifted."

e. Contrary to Art. VII, Sec. 2, 1973 Constitution, the President (because he is also the Prime Minister) is a member of the IBP.

The IBP is only *interim* in nature and does not have any of the inherent powers exercised by Congress, since the legislative power is *not vested* in the IBP. Under the 1935 Constitution, lawmaking power was vested in the old Congress, by virtue of which the incumbent president is able to exercise his present powers. This is reiterated in the fifth amendment, which empowers him to continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.



The IBP shall be composed of not more than 120 members unless otherwise provided by law (or Presidential decree). At the April 7, 1978 elections, the total number was increased to 179 elective members, including 14 sectoral representatives. Members of the Cabinet were also appointed to the IBP.

The specific functions enumerated in the transitory provisions are goals which the incumbent President has been pursuing under the New Society. These include primarily the IBP's task of enacting priority measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system. The other emphasis lies in the reorganization of Government, the eradication of graft and corruption, maintenance of peace and order, implementation of agrarian reform, standardization of compensation for government employees, and such other measures as shall bridge the gap between the rich and the poor. (Art. XVII, Sec. 5).

\* \* \*

OUR NEW SOCIETY has resulted in an expansion of human freedom. More of our people have become participants in the political system; already, we have freed our people from their role as a mere gallery of consent. By enrolling the overwhelming majority of our people in the political process, we have created in these new institutions a real-life school in the art of representative democracy.

It is in discussions in these new forums of national opinion that the masses of Filipinos become part of the political process, and learn the art of consensus, as well as the latitudes and the just limits of free speech.

Through experience, we may learn, at last, that free speech does not mean loud noise, boasting, seduction, or malicious criticism; that freedom costs blood and so is too dear to waste on destructive foolishness. Truth is the



just objective of free speech. Then, democracy need not be a facade, a veneer used to mask the unchanging framework of feudalism and colonialism. Then a democracy can be based on the strength of its own initial power—the Filipino people.







## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOCIAL JUSTICE AND OUR PEOPLE

IN THE Philippine experience, social justice has never been an abstract concept. It has been, and continues to be, a constitutional, historical and political imperative.

One need not search far and wide for evidence of this. Social justice is enshrined in the very heart of the Constitution. To me, it is the key provision in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies:

“The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.”

This, to me, is a powerful statement. Whenever I come across it, I never fail to be amazed at the manner in which this provision was framed by the 1971 Consti-



tutional Convention. My amazement grows out of two considerations:

First, it is an improvement over the social justice provision of the old Constitution.

Second, it underscores what, to me, has been the basic theme in the thoughts of our greatest political and revolutionary leaders: that man can never achieve true freedom *without* equality.

That the present social justice provision improves on the old one we can see from a simple comparison of texts. In the old Constitution, the provision reads: "The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State."

What one immediately notices, apart from the stark simplicity of the text, is its almost tentative phrasing. Note that the "promotion of social justice is not made mandatory: the provision states merely that it *should be* the concern of the State." By comparison, the new Constitution is emphatic and decisive: "The State *shall promote* social justice..."

But what was truly defective in the social justice provision of the old Constitution was its *ambiguity*—a fact pointed out on many occasions by the Supreme Court. More than any other provision in the old Constitution, it was this social justice provision that the Court has had to interpret lengthily. And it is to these long and learned discussions that we owe the emphatic social justice provision of the new Constitution. Without these precedents, we would never have dared to declare so positively the state's commitment to social justice.

As a student of law, I steeped myself in the landmark decisions that have charted the course of social justice in this country. It is to these decisions that I owe



part of my early education in social justice. I cannot discuss social justice without quoting at length from those decisions, for they are part of my own social justice heritage. Incidentally, most of them were written by Jose P. Laurel, truly one of the most brilliant judicial minds our country has produced.

In 1940, then Mr. Chief Justice Laurel had this to say in interpretation of the social justice provisions: "... (T)he legislation which we are now called upon to construe was enacted in pursuance of what appears to be the deliberate embodiment of a new social policy, founded on the conception of a society integrated not by independent individuals' dealings at arm's length, but by interdependent members of a consolidated whole, whose interests must be protected against mutual aggression and warfare among and between diverse units which are impelled by countervailing and opposite individual and group interests... In the United States labor legislation has undergone a long process of development too long to narrate here... Scrutiny of legislation in that country and of pronouncements made by its Supreme Court reveals a continuous renovation and change made necessary by the impact of changing needs and economic pressure brought about by the irresistible momentum of new social and economic forces being developed there... In the Philippines, social legislation has had a similar development... In the midst of changes that have taken place it may be doubted (whether) previous pronouncements made by this court still retain [their] virtually as living principles. The policy of *laissez faire* has, to some extent, given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interests."

The basis for this change in government's attitude, of its new willingness to intervene in the affairs of its



citizens to achieve social balance, if not equality, Laurel discussed further in the same decision:

"It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress, which was threatening the stability of governments the world over. Alive to the social and economic forces at work, the framers of our Constitution boldly met the problems and difficulties which forced them and endeavored to crystallize, with more or less fidelity, the political, social and economic propositions of their age; and this they did, with the consciousness that the political and philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a great jurist, 'be doubted by the next and perhaps entirely discarded by the third.' Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution which are intended to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between competent elements of society through the application of what may be termed as the *justitia communis* advocated by Grotius and Leibnitz many years ago to be secured through the counter-balancing of economic and social forces and opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it were in *custodia societatis*. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people was thus inserted as a vital principle in our Constitution. And in order that this declaration of principle may not just be an empty medley of words, the Constitution in various sections thereof has provided means toward its realization. . ."

The right of government to intervene in the social and economic order, to promote social justice, was then a novel idea. But because of persuasive arguments of Laurel and other Supreme Court justices, such a right, slowly but surely, became an accepted fact of national life.



Another landmark decision by Laurel was one in which he sought to define social justice itself. This is a classic formulation that I think deserves to be quoted in full:

"Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of the social and economic forces of the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community; constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable or extra-constitutionally through the exercise of power underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of *salus populi est supreme lex*."

This definition, given at a later period in Laurel's stewardship of the high court, gives government two options in the exercise of power for the promotion of social justice: the first option through constitutional processes, the second through extra-constitutional means. From this alone, we see the stirrings of an advocacy that government can, and should, take an activist attitude in promoting social justice.

But, perhaps, even Chief Justice Laurel was being too cautious. For example, the option that he thought was extra-constitutional, later decisions of the Supreme Court clearly regarded as constitutional:

"Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guarantee are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between



values given and received, equitable sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their production as applied to metropolitan centers, especially in relation to housing problems. It is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and houses that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation, light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the *destitute*." (Underscoring mine).

The activist promotion of social justice by government—already clearly constitutional even under the aegis of an ambiguous provision—should be all the more constitutional under a more explicit provision in our present Constitution. I take comfort in this observation because, as I have always taken great effort to note, government not only has the *right*, but the *duty* to intervene in the social, political and economic order.

It is this concept of duty that moves me today in my task of laying the foundations of the New Society. The distinction is vital to me, because a *right*, is always subject to discretion: one may choose whether or not to exercise it. *Duty* does not admit any discretion whatsoever: it is something that one *must* do. This distinction also holds true for the social justice provisions of the old and the new Constitutions. The old Constitution emphasized *right* over *duty*: "The promotion of social justice. . . *should* be the concern of the State." It is *duty* that is emphasized in the new Constitution: "The State *shall promote* social justice. . ."

It is also comforting for me to note that this concept of *duty* in the promotion of social justice has been upheld by a surviving former Chief Justice and the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.



In 1970, then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal had this to say: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than any private individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity, if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here, as almost everywhere else, the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here, of course, the development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principles concerning the promotion of social justice."

This is what Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has to say:

"The regime of liberty contemplated in the Constitution with social justice as a fundamental principle to reinforce the pledge in the preamble of promoting the general welfare *reflects traditional concepts of a democratic polity infused with an awareness of the vital and pressing need for the government to assume a much more active and vigorous role in the conduct of public affairs.* The framers of our fundamental law were as one in their strongly-held belief that thereby the grave and serious infirmity then confronting our body politic, on the whole still with us now, of great inequality of wealth and mass poverty, with the great bulk of our people ill-clad, ill-housed, ill-fed, could be remedied. Nothing less than communal effort, massive in extent and earnestly engaged in, would suffice." (Underscoring mine).



Chief Justice Fernando speaks not only of a "vital and pressing need for government to assume a much more active and vigorous role in the conduct of public affairs" but of this need being reflective of "traditional concepts of a democratic polity." This is a valid observation: many of our political and revolutionary leaders have been of this frame of mind. The concept of government actively promoting social justice through necessary interventions in the private sphere was never alien to them. One of their basic ideas has been that freedom is impossible without equality. Thus, the need for government actively to promote social justice.

I need but cite a few examples of this theme. In his time, Emilio Jacinto wrote:

"In every community and society there is need of a head, of one who has power over the rest of direction and good example, and for the maintenance of unity among members and associates, and who will guide them to the desired goal, just a vessel that is not guided by a skillful navigator runs the risk of losing its course. . . This head is called the government. . . The object of all government is the people and the security and welfare of the people must be the aim of all its laws and acts. . . . The welfare of the people and nothing else is the legal reason and object, the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, of all the duties of those who govern."

And in the more poetic language of Apolinario Mabini: "Whenever men join together to perform a certain activity. . . there should be someone who apportions to each the specific work. Otherwise they would not know what the other is doing and nothing will be accomplished . . . If society is nothing else but a mere agglomerate of persons moving without direction, order or coordination, then it is truly a corpse: for whatever one member might do, the other may undo. It would not be long before the



members would be fighting and the society dissolved. . . It is then necessary to have a soul that will give life to society and this Soul is Authority."

Finally, of more recent vintage is the classic formulation of President Ramon Magsaysay: "He who has less in life should have more in law."

Even as it is a constitutional imperative, therefore, the promotion of social justice is also a historical and political imperative. Perhaps it is even more particularly imperative in our day and age, characterized by what I have termed "the rebellion of the poor." It is to meet the demands of this rebellion that all of our efforts to promote social justice are addressed.

And to the thoughts previously quoted, I would like humbly to add my own, culled from my introduction to the Philippine Development Plans:

"At the heart of the Plans is the concern for social justice. The preparation of these Plans has been guided by one objective: No Filipino shall be without sustenance.

"We have therefore set our Development Plans towards a direct and purposeful attack against poverty by: focusing on the poorest of our society, planning to meet their basic nutritional needs, reducing if not entirely eliminating illiteracy, expanding employment opportunities, improving access to better social services, equalizing opportunities, sharing the fruits of development equitably, and introducing the requisite institutional changes.

"We will pursue economic development for social justice. We will engage the initiative and resources of our people, according all citizens a rightful share in benefits and obligations. As both the source and object of development, our people will be provided with adequate economic opportunities and social amenities to attain a dignified existence.



"Accordingly, our Development Plans transcend statistical GNP and other economic statistics, investments and infrastructure. They are addressed to the basic concerns of the Filipino.

"In operationalizing this endeavor, the measures to be taken must not only include those which directly alter the distribution of income and wealth, but also those which expand opportunities for employment advancement and the capacity to participate and share in development."

Indeed, we may say that the new name for social justice is development. For their ideals and objectives are, may well be in the final analysis, the real objectives of the Development Plans we have drafted. And, we are proud to say, these are perhaps the only plans for national development that have been prepared with the ends of social justice in mind. It is this fusion of social justice and economic development that I feel is our own significant contribution to the social justice tradition I have outlined.



## CHAPTER SIX

### INTERNAL REVOLUTION

NO AMOUNT of economic progress can have an impact on Filipino society unless it leaves an indelible imprint on the poor man—not so much in satiating his stomach as in awakening his indifferent soul. For it is one thing to receive benefits and another to derive satisfaction and fulfillment from them. The receipt of benefits may be equated with the acquisition of material goods; but the feeling of satisfaction and fulfillment can only come from restructuring mental dispositions and evolving an authentic individual and social consciousness.

Government's commitment to workable and far-reaching economic reforms, therefore, must be coupled with an equally determined and vigorously pursued commitment to social and moral reform. We must make the masses of our people understand the exact nature of the material transformations that take effect and the adverse conditions that make such changes necessary. Every Filipino must be prepared to cope with developments, as we move



from the old society to the new. Everyone must recognize the need to discard old values and to adopt new ones in keeping with the needs of altered times.

All of us must become part of an irrepressible movement to rediscover a truly Filipino culture. No one must be spared in the drive to mold, out of the diversity of expectations and outlooks, a unified Filipino consciousness. Most important, those among us who have not joined the mainstream of reorganized society must awaken to the truth that our very own dreams, hopes, and aspirations have called forth the democratic revolution; that, therefore, everyone is part of the process of transformation; and that these changes are not unilaterally imposed by government as an outside agent. The Filipino masses are the central characters in this movement; the burden is on them to play an active role—to take charge of events, and not to allow events merely to happen to them.

Indeed, changes in the socioeconomic system must, and in fact do, entail corresponding alterations in people's consciousness. But these changes do not necessarily take place at a complementary rate. In the Philippine setting, social consciousness has evolved at such a slow pace that it has impeded the implementation of economic reforms. And if this trend has exhibited a tendency to persist, we have a number of colonial roots to blame.

One long-standing root that has to be severed involves the Filipino character—which has been invariably described as dominated by indolence, docility, passivity, a pervading consciousness of racial inferiority, shyness, and a resistance to being enlightened. To be sure, these stereotypes do not fairly and accurately reflect the comprehensive Filipino personality. However, we can hardly deny that our national history is replete with accounts



of critical periods, when Filipinos had failed to respond firmly to threatening circumstances.

We are told for instance, that over long periods during the Spanish occupation, half of the villages in the country were under the direct authority of no one but the local friar. The Spanish priest alone ran almost all the affairs of local government. Yet the people so lacked an understanding of their own situation—and the motivation to act—to assert the power implicit in their number. This is not to say, of course, that the Filipinos had all the negative traits only. Lapu-Lapu still stands as a symbol of the early Filipinos' resistance to foreign invasion. But colonization took its toll, and the habit of subservience it encouraged became ingrained in the Filipino character.

The union of Church and State under Spanish rule had a lot to do with this process of pacification and intellectual subjugation. In the hands of the political authorities, religion ensured the mass-production of servile colonials. All too conveniently, Spanish Catholicism preached such "virtues" as resignation, passivity, and respect for authority.

The artistic culture encouraged by the colonizers was equally to blame. Literature was largely limited to any Filipino who wanted to be in the good graces of the rulers had to assume the attitude of the clerical class. In a real sense, therefore, to be favored was to be anti-Filipino. To be successful, the Filipino colonial had to give up his heritage.

Informal education was even more suffocating, in the manner it permeated the network of social interrelations. In the course of the Filipino relationship with the Spanish aggressors, most of our ordinary people developed *not* hatred, but admiration for, the Spanish way of life. In the long run, this admiration developed in one of two



ways: either into a strong motivation to work towards the money needed to share the ways of those in power, or into a decline to indolence, because of the realization of the immense gap that separated the colonized from their colonizers. Either way, events took an unsatisfactory turn. The impulse to learn the ways of the powerful could only be generated at the expense of the rest of the underprivileged and the weak, without reversing the general colonial trend. On the other hand, the predisposition to extremes of indolence became the last steps in the process of dehumanization.

The state of the nation before martial law reflected our futile struggle for liberation from the conditions of colonialism. For Spanish domination had left us persistent lives of saints, the *pasyon*, the metric romances, the *moro-moros*, and the *corridos*. Paintings and sculptures were confined to religious imagery. Religious processions and other ceremonial displays emphasized man's search for salvation and the bliss of heaven. Thus, the initiative to assert one's self and to improve one's condition in life was pre-empted by the desire to submit one's soul to the service of God and His representatives on earth. The colonizers very easily exploited this patient submissiveness to achieve their own goals and designs for their Philippine colony.

Another root that needs severing is our tradition of colonial education in its formal, as well as its informal, aspects. For instance, we know that education in early Spanish times was a haphazard affair in the hands of the parish priest. Not until the last century of their rule did the Spaniards establish a system of national instruction. Even then, instruction was limited to teaching the basic skills. Moreover, higher education was heavy with diversionary overtones. Instead of awakening the students' minds to the reality of their socioeconomic and



political position, it focused their attention on irrelevant, academic pursuits. The result was that advanced studies drew Filipino scholars into the clerical tradition of the Spanish monastics, legacy of inferiority and ignorance. And when the Revolution had seemed ready to synthesize the aspirations of the Filipinos, new colonizers, the Americans, stepped in.

It is not surprising that, even in these early stages of our march towards a new society, Filipinos should still show the traces of our past. Among other things, one sees in the masses of our people an alienation from central political concerns. Although the extent of mass participation in political decision-making has been encouraging, the level of active involvement by citizens in political life still requires upgrading. In other words, physical participation does not contain the proper spirit of socialization we need if we are to attain our nation's goals. As long as we fail to appreciate the significance of mass political participation, we cannot attain an integrated national identity.

Indeed, the predominantly paternalistic view that we have of political and socioeconomic relations has been largely responsible for the fragmented Filipino consciousness and, therefore, the loose national identity. Before martial law, local and even national elections were individual contests between political personalities more than resolutions of conflicts of popular values and interests. Popularity, not issues, settled them. Thus, elections perpetuated the paternalistic remnants of feudal society: candidates were regarded as *padrinos* in whose hands lay the fate of the people. Real issues (if any came up for discussion) were obscured: the poor remained vulnerable to manipulation; and the conflicts between the various classes of society remained unresolved.



Economic interaction had basically the same problems. The poor man was trapped in the clutches of superior economic forces. He may struggle to prosper and rise above his class. But, because of the economic structure, he could achieve his individual prosperity only at the expense of exploiting other poor people. For the poor man, therefore, manhood required the ability to become a traitor to his own kind.

There are many examples of this economic alienation. The farmer who becomes a beneficiary of agrarian reform may see its value not in his emancipation, but in the opportunity it gives him to become a landowner and, thus, have his own tenant-workers. In short, the Filipino poor had an individualistic view of social upliftment. Coupled with the covert longing to identify with the rich and the powerful, this prevented him from developing class consciousness. Of course, he was aware of his lowly economic status; but precisely because of his entrapment in oppressive conditions, he failed to grasp the true character of oppression.

To be sure, the privileged and the powerful did not have a role solely as perpetrators. They were equally victims of the fragmented national consciousness. They did not see their superior status as a privilege—and a privilege that dehumanized others, and even themselves. They failed to see that in their frantic drive to *own*, they became so attached to material objects that they lost awareness of the *human existence* of those they trampled on. In the process, the privileged also lost their social conscience and dehumanized themselves. They were reduced from being human beings into mere owners of material things.

In the view of this dehumanized oligarchy, the acquisition of more and more wealth was a right derived through their own efforts. Other people were underprivileged only because of incompetence and laziness—and



their refusal to acknowledge the patronage of the rich. Thus, privileged Filipinos lost their sense of moral responsibility and social accountability.

But the most worrisome feature of neo-colonial Filipino society was its pervading air of disunity. The early Filipinos had no cultural base strong enough to resist Spanish influence: colonial rule denied the Filipino heritage the chance to mature independently. Other Asian countries had evolved sophisticated civilizations before being exposed to colonial rule. The Philippines still was an archipelago of tiny principalities when it was overrun in the sixteenth century. As a consequence, whatever indigenous culture there was Spanish rule easily eroded, and prevented from developing into one national culture.

The result was an amalgam of unintegrated outlooks and misconceptions, irrelevant to the real requirements of the Filipino nation. As time went on, the colonial traits inculcated by the Spaniards were reinforced by American influences. Thus, as we faced the challenges of the 1960s, we had no clear conception of who we were. We had no clear and integrated concept of what the Filipino stood for, what he dreamed of, and what his world was leading to. It is true that in the 1890s, the revolutionary consciousness centering on the *Katipunan* had molded the Filipinos into one nationalist force. But Filipino comprehension of the issues remained superficial even then. And the Americans made sure the situation remained that way. As a result, no genuine Filipino identity could emerge. Geographically, we were one people, but this geographic unity was not reinforced by the Filipino consciousness of being one nation.

Thus, a democratic revolution is clearly indicated by Filipino circumstances—and it has to take two aspects, the material and the attitudinal. Material, because of the need to overhaul socioeconomic foundations; and at-



titudinal, because of the need to realign Filipino values and value judgments. And as the material revolution is guided mainly by our egalitarian ideal, so is the attitudinal revolution animated by our humanistic principles. The attitudinal revolution is especially crucial, if only to prove that government and people can radically alter existing social relations without recourse to physical violence. Thus, our commitment to value realignment through humanistic education.

This commitment entails our unfailing devotion to the task of recreating a human society—a *creative* society. This task, in turn, requires the replacement of individualism with social conscience. Where our people failed because they were confined by personal ambition and historical factors in their struggle for individual survival, we must now recognize the necessity of inculcating collective ideals. The old society failed because people kept to themselves, oblivious of moral degradation and cultural deterioration. Now, the conviction of poor people that they must work hard for their emancipation should be viewed *not* as a gift bestowed by government, but as an integral component of their own awakening. This means that they must reach this conviction as active subjects, not as passive objects. The masses of Filipinos must intervene in the process of change—and intervene critically. For the function of the government is not forever to intercede in their behalf, in social and political confrontations, but simply to assure them the chance to intercede critically for themselves. The masses should know that government is at their service. A people conscious of its dignity never forgets this. On the other hand, government has the obligation to make the people realize that dignity and sovereignty are inseparable, and that a free people has to be a sovereign people. The New Society, therefore, challenges the masses of Filipinos to ac-



cept an active role in national life and to accept primary responsibility for the nation's encounter with its destiny.

It is this same challenge that makes necessary our rethinking of basic education as *learning to be* rather than as *learning to do*. Although we take pride in being a literate people, our "superior" education has only served to alienate us from one another: the rich from the poor, the learned from the ignorant. To be relevant, education must involve the people in the task not only of understanding—but of criticizing, dissenting, and, if need be, resisting. Basic knowledge must be supplemented by the motivation to see and understand the world, to develop one's faculties of observation and judgment, to cultivate the critical spirit, and to cultivate a sense of responsibility for others. We must, therefore, emphasize cooperative effort over competition and collective over individual goals.

The overriding principle is that we must transform ourselves, as we try to transform society. If we do not recognize the significance of the attitudinal revolution, we will continue to breathe the murky spirit of our colonial past, and our social transformation will be ineffectual. Thus, we must construe our mandate to instigate changes as a mandate to change ourselves as well. Only if we are sincere in this individual and collective transformation can we achieve a blending of our geographical identity and our consciousness of being one nation.

The Filipino's avowed goals in life are his very anchor in times of war and peace. Life is the first and foremost consideration. In times of war and in times of crises, his instinct for survival is keenest; in times of peace, his ambition to live the most human life possible preoccupies him. He strives to satisfy his intellectual, social, cultural, and political needs over and beyond his basic economic necessities.



And so as he goes through the process of experimentation, adjustments, adaptation, assimilation, and acculturation, he is most frequently misunderstood. Sometimes, he is accused of being a spineless, rudderless denizen of the world, whose identity is still something to be discovered. By digging deep into his unconscious past and breaking through the thick layers of foreign influences that have piled up one on top of the other.

But he is not a reed buffeted by the storms of change. He is not an other-directed fellow who sways where the wind blows. His roots are deep, and his commitment to a life that is human if not divine is steadfast. He is an inner-directed person who knows what he is about, and knows where he is going, despite the many blind alleys on the labyrinthine path to the good and the beautiful life that he envisions for himself.

Thus, as an inner-directed, self-propelled thinking person, the Filipino initiates changes where changes should take place as he sees fit.

As a people, true to our characteristics, we are not a nation that easily gives up when difficulties arise. We innovate and improvise. Suicide is not in our ethos. We do not as lemmings do rush to the sea of damnation, but we sail towards our own salvation.

Our raft of democratic revolution may not be perfect, but in our voyage in the ocean of democracy, we have very well managed and are quite correct in the direction we are taking. Now and then the racking and rolling bother us; nonetheless, our will to survive and arrive at our destiny as a nation waxes strong and becomes resolute with every victory we gain and as we overcome our external and internal problems.

We have done very well in patching up the tiny holes and in tightening the loose ends in our democratic revo-



lution by institutionalizing concern for the weakest of the weak and the smallest of the small. We have always been inculcating in the minds of our people that our salvation lies in carrying each other's burden, because we are a nation one in spirit though diverse in religion and culture.

We look forward, therefore, to the full fruition of that greatness we have envisioned for ourselves, the seed of which is already securely implanted upon the renewal of our society when we first launched the democratic revolution of 1972.







## CHAPTER SEVEN

### FOR A NEW SOCIETY

THE KIND OF SOCIETY that emerged from Spanish rule was characterized by a small political and economic elite, no middle class of significance, a vast majority of the poor, and a Muslim minority unassimilated in the national community.

The five years of strife that marked the transition from Spanish to American rule only served to enmesh our country in another net of colonial subjection. The 37 years that followed 1905 ended in the travail of another foreign occupation, this time by the Japanese. When "Liberation" came in 1945, the Filipinos rose from their suffering only to plunge into the trials of reconstruction, a shattered economy, soaring inflation, rebellion, partisan politics, corruption, despair and mass poverty.

By the 1960s, public opinion had turned cynical; justice was for a few, misery was for the many, and faith had become despair. The 1970s began in chaos, and many of our people spilled out into the streets driven by frus-



tration, by anger at their lot, and by demands that clawed at the very structure of society.

There were a few good lessons we could draw from those vicissitudes. The best we might say is that we have become a nation; we found heroes and heroism; and our people demonstrated a remarkable capacity to survive. Aside from these, all we had left was a society on the brink of ruin. Martial law came in time to stop short our fall into chaos.

Paradoxically, the ferment, the turmoil, the violent cries of the early 1970s were *not* entirely pointless. Amidst the clamor, a single message became clear: our people demanded a revolutionary assertion of their aspirations for a better life. They evoked a response in the national leadership. Rather than allow either the leftists or the oligarchs to mischannel the revolutionary demands of our people, we led them along the path of constitutional authoritarianism: which is to say, we asserted the powers inherent in our Constitution to determine our priorities and to focus national energies on our national resources.

In brief, the revolutionary demands of our people became the mandate of the New Society—our people's instrument for achieving justice and the good life.

### **Our Crisis Government**

Revolution is a basic restructuring of government and society.

Taken purely on this textbook basis, it is possible—as the history of nations has demonstrated—for revolution to lead to forms of government and ways of life of extreme indifference, even cruelty, to the people themselves. This is what occurs when revolution enables a political elite, or an economic elite, to rule as an alien



and hostile force against its own people. Then, society is stratified into the exploiting and the exploited.

To avoid this evil swindle of our people, the crisis government rooted itself in the Constitution, and in the people's aspirations. Thus, based on law, and on fulfilling popular goals, martial law became a unique force for realizing the revolutionary aspirations of the Filipinos.

Since the New Society is our revolutionary instrument, its reason for being is the welfare of our people. Thus, martial law finds its moral fulfillment in having principles and goals that are absolutely one with the principles and the goals of our people.

Let us stress this phrase: "our people." Not one individual, but *all Filipinos*; not one class, but all classes in our national society. Our principle is to build, not to destroy; not to pull down, but to raise up; not to exalt, but to balance the interest of one with the interests of all.

To be sure, we are now emphasizing the Filipino masses, the "many who have too little," *because* their condition of mass-poverty prevents our achievement of social balance. Our masses hang too low on the scale, creating a precariousness that, if uncorrected, will inevitably drag everyone down. As the strongest force in society, government represents the most effective way to help our masses up, until the social scale is balanced.

This balancing of the social scale is imperative to national survival, as history has demonstrated time and again in all nations. The consequences of social imbalance are lurid enough: degradation for most or bloody revolution for all. Since it is our masses who are most in need of help, it is entirely natural that they receive our immediate and emphatic attention.

To help our masses is to help everyone else, because everyone else will, therefore, acquire the social stability that alone serves and protects the interests of all.



Our revolution being nationally oriented, our goals and our means are, necessarily, nationally oriented as well. For example, we find it wanting to conceive of "equality" per se; it becomes clear to us in the more precise phrase "social equality." "Justice" as a concept is ambiguous, and acquires real meaning for us when we conceive it as "*social justice*."

Having in mind the social orientation of our revolution, therefore, it becomes clear why all our programs are designed to have the widest possible social impact.

Thus, since we have discerned that there could be no social equality in a society composed of the economically strong and the economically weak, our continuing emphasis is to spread the economic opportunities in our nation to the masses, whose weakness derives from their poverty. But since social justice is also an equally necessary goal of our revolution, we drag no one down; nor do we allow anyone to hold anyone else down either.

We have, therefore, selected as our means to bring about social equality a steady and determined bid to redistribute national wealth through better tax efforts, coupled with the use of such taxes and other revenue-raising means (such as government bonds) to build the public works needs of our people and to stir up economic activity in our towns and barrios. Of course, we at the same time buttress these economic efforts with laws and enforcement that channel both private and government resources to social usefulness, and that maintain the social order essential to all our plans for development.

The details that make up our implementation of these objectives are clearly to be seen in the daily workings of government. While it may be conceptually difficult for us to hold in our minds as an integrated whole all these details of laws, encouragement to business to be fair to labor, and order for all, we may comprehend them as



decreed by our people's aspirations for justice and the good life.

Our revolution's mandate, indeed, is to render to our people the justice and the good life that are their birth-right. Translating this broad mandate into principles and specific policies is the great mission of our time.

Let us sum up the major principles of our revolution.

### **Principles Of Our Revolution**

Our revolution is *democratic*, because it is *for* our people.

It is enabling the masses of our people to achieve the decent minimum of prosperity to enable them freely to take part in national, political and social life. Poverty has weakened our people, rendering them a prey to manipulation and corruption by those whose ambitions were backed by wealth and power. Therefore, it is mass prosperity that will enable our people to cast their votes with dictation from no one but reason.

Enlargement of the political franchise to cover 15-year olds, whether literate or not, whether rich or poor, widens the base of national consensus. Millions of our people, once excluded from political life, now take part in shaping the national destiny. Ours—let us note this carefully—is the most widely-based national consensus in the world.

Our revolution is *constitutional*, giving to the will of men the shape established by fundamental law.

Justice is administered impartially, and those who enforce it are *not* themselves above the law. Social order is upheld by laws known to all and applied to all. Privilege may now and then regain its cunning way of old, but its detection means swift correction.



The point is that since we are at the beginning of our national resurgence, perfection has yet to be approximated. But these are days when the police are themselves policed, and the military continually cleanses its ranks. No Filipino need beg for justice: it is his birth-right.

### **Our Revolution Is Freedom-Oriented.**

The New Society has expanded our human freedom because it provides the order which enables each Filipino to move freely under law, instead of being blocked and frustrated by lawlessness, privilege and social chaos. Partisan clamor has been stilled, and now the people's voice emerges clearly. In establishing the social and economic conditions which enable men to be truly free, the New Society is giving substance to our ancient dream of freedom.

The New Society government regards itself as being responsible for leading our people in achieving their aspirations. Responsibility for a mission carries with it the inherent right to have all the authority required for its fulfillment. Responsibility without authority is meaningless; only responsibility *with* authority is useful.

The dimensions of our revolutionary responsibility are as great as the future we envision on ourselves.

But in giving responsibility to government, which is the instrument of the democratic revolution in the Philippines, Filipinos cannot avoid the necessity of accepting their own individual and class responsibility to respond to *our* national aspirations. Thus, responsibility for government automatically returns to responsibility for ourselves, because the policies and programs set by government can work only through us and with us.

Since society is a complex integration of various individuals, groups, talents, skills, and energies, each man



must perform his part within one over-all design, if society is to survive and progress. Each Filipino has his specific role and value; and the essence of individual responsibility is to do well whatever role it is that fate and circumstance have assigned to each one of us. National success is a national endeavour.

The head of a team is responsible for translating the energies and the aspirations of team members into group objectives and programs; he is responsible as well for unifying coordination. But balancing this, if success is to be gained, is the wholehearted cooperation of every member of the team.

This concept of mutual responsibility is crucial to our New Society. For, paradoxically, as I have said, the inherent mission of our crisis government is to render itself unnecessary. Just now, national emergencies and the imperative of accelerating popular progress have made it necessary that we focus national energy through a centralized government system. But it remains our republican tradition that people exercise political authority as directly as possible.

The faster, then, we achieve social justice and social equality, the faster way we be able to establish a parliamentary form of government.

In brief, what is called for is a decisive moral determination by each of us, for all of us, that nation-building is a personal responsibility.

In simple situations, this may be shown, as when one refuses to litter a sidewalk—not because it is in front of one's house but because the litter would be in one's country. In greater situations, this may also be shown—as when we comply with the law not because of fear, but because we realize how our single act of commission or omission could upset our stabilized and social balance.



"Your character," Herodotus once observed, "is your fate."

The gravest mandate of our revolution is that we transmute our national character into one great enough to merit, and thus to achieve, our dreams.

### **The Challenge Of Nation-Building**

To build a nation is no easy task. It is too complex and too great for any one individual to do. But it can be done, and it has been done many times, by men who act in concert, toward the same goal.

Our people have known enough of exploitation. It is time that our people shared equitably in the fruits of their labor and their land.

The time we speak of is now and all the years to come.

We have often heard it said that some terrible event turned out to be "a blessing in disguise." We can view the turmoils of the past—particularly of the sixties and the seventies—in this light. For terrible as they were, they revealed to our people their reserve strength to combat adversity. They revealed a strength we had only glimpsed during the heroic moments of our past.

All too often, our people have chosen ease over hard work, and individualism over social cooperation. But when necessity evoked the need for a new society, people revealed a strength of character to accept discipline, for the sake of national survival. As young adults turn away from games, so our people have shown themselves responsive to the maturity that nation-building requires.

The greatest strength of our crisis government is that it is one with the aspirations of our people.

There are only two options for us at this watershed in our history: to fall back to the old ways of corruption,



turmoil, and partisan conflict, or to accept this new day of discipline, challenge, and determination.

The first is unthinkable. It can have merit only for those who had exploiters' privileges in the old society.

Our New Society offers the alternative of discipline, challenge, and purposive determination. In it reposes our personal share of the present and the future.

In awarding to the political authority the responsibility for realizing our revolutionary aspirations, we, in truth, give the same mandate to ourselves.

The New Society was evoked by the needs of our people. It is their revolution: hence, it is our revolution.

Social equality through the conquest of mass poverty.

Social justice through equality before the law and primary emphasis on the advancement of our masses.

Dedication and discipline to focus all our national energies on attaining these social objectives.

We have risen to claim our destiny.







## INDEX

### A

- Agrarian reform, 68
  - Implementation of, 50
- Agricultural labor, 44-45
- Alternative future, 9
- American(s), 30, 67
  - Constitution, 37
  - Influences, 69
  - Libertarian ideals, 6
  - Rule, 75
  - Society, 37
- Anarchism, radical, 20
- Asian countries, 69
- Assembly, right to, 16
- Attitudinal revolution *see*
  - Revolution, Attitudinal
- Authentic democracy, 19, 21
- Authority, 61
  - And public welfare, 35

### B

- Barangay, 40, 41-43
  - Aims of, 42
  - Charter, 41
  - Functions of, 46
  - Importance of, 45-46
  - Membership, 41
  - Policies of, 48
- Barangay Assembly, 42-43
- Barangay council, 41-42
- Barrio charter, revised, 41
- Batasang Bayan, 47-48
- Bureaucracy, 17
  - Oppressive, 16
  - Spanish, 32
- Bureaucratic positions, 20

### C

- Capitalism, 24
- Capitalistic economy, 30
  - Nature of, 25
- Cartesianism, 15
- Change, radical, 23
- Church and State, union of, 65
- Citizens assembly *see* Barangay
- Citizens, forum for, 48
- Civilization, history of, 15
- Class consciousness, 33, 68
- Class revolution, 33
  - 'Closed' ideology, 2, 3
- Coal reserves, exploitation of, 28
- Collective transformation, 71
- Colonial administration,
  - demands of, 31
- Colonial authority, 38
- Colonial government, Spanish,
  - 30
- Colonial roots, 64, 66
- Colonial rule, 30-31, 69
- Colonial subjection, 75
- Colonialism, 51, 66
- Common-interest groups, 44-45
- Communism, 6
- Community beautification
  - projects, 42
- Community government *see*
  - Barangay
- Community of nations, 28
- Constitution
  - 1935, 49
  - 1973, 48
    - Framers of, 34
    - Powers of, 76
- Constitutional authoritarianism,
  - 76
- Constitutional Convention,
  - 1971, 53-54



*Constitutional* revolution, 79  
*Corridos*, 66  
 Corruption, 38  
     Ways of, 82  
 Creativity, 15  
 Creeds, 2  
 Crisis government, 76-79  
     Mission of, 81  
     Strength of, 82  
 Critical spirit, 71  
 Cultural advancement, 28  
 Cultural creeds, 71  
 Culture, artistic, 65  
*Custodia societatis*, 56

## D

Declaration of Principles and  
     State Policies, 53  
 Dehumanization, 66  
 Democracy, 40, 51  
     American precept of, 37-40  
     Failure of, 20  
 Democratic consensus, 40  
 Democratic government, estab-  
     lishment of, 31  
 Democratic ideals, 17, 19  
 Democratic politicalization, 31  
     Exercise in, 30  
 Democratic polity, 59, 60  
 Democratic revolution, 6, 7, 27,  
     29, 34, 64, 69, 72-73  
     Instrument of, 80  
     Internationalization of, 7  
     Theory of, 26  
 Democratic rights, 17  
 Democratic theory, 20  
     American, 20  
 Democratic tradition, 19, 21, 22  
 Democratization, 17  
 Development, 62  
     Fruits of, 61

Dignity, 70  
 Direction, sense of, 34  
 Discipline, 82  
     Alternative of, 83  
 Drug victims, rehabilitation of,  
     42  
 Duty, concept of, 58

## E

Economic alienation, 68  
 Economic conditions, 20  
 Economic development, 61-62  
     Flowering of, 27  
 Economic elite, 17, 38, 76  
 Economic forces, socialization of,  
     59  
 Economic groups, 25  
 Economic interaction, problems  
     of, 68  
 Economic necessities, 71  
 Economic power, 38  
 Economic reforms, 63  
     Implementation of, 64  
 Economic rights, 16, 17, 19  
 Economic self-sufficiency, 37  
 Economic stability, 57  
 Economy, types of, 24  
 Education  
     Basic, 71  
     Colonial, 66  
     Higher, 66-67  
     Humanistic, 70  
     Informal, 65  
     Superior, 71  
 Egalitarian commitment, 15  
 Egalitarian ideal, 13-17  
     Importance of, 13  
 Egalitarian polity, commitment  
     to, 14  
 Egalitarian society, 6  
 Egalitarianism, demand of, 29



Elections, 67  
  April 7, 1978, 50  
  Periodic, 19  
Employers, 44  
Employment opportunities, expansion of, 61  
Energy conservation  
  Demands of, 28  
  Measures, 28  
Equality, 5  
  Principle of, 14  
Equality before the law, 57  
Equality of opportunity, 57  
Equality of political rights, 57  
Executive Branch, policies and programs of, 48

## F

Fernando, Enrique M., 59, 60  
Feudal society, 67  
Feudalism, 51  
Filipino(s), 63, 65, 72  
  Character, 64-65  
  Consciousness, 64, 67, 69  
  Culture  
    Rediscovery of, 64  
    Values of, 6  
  Democratic rights, 17  
  Heritage, 69  
  Identity, 69  
  Masses, 16, 17, 64, 70, 77  
    Challenge to, 70-71  
  Nation, 69  
  Oligarchy, 18  
  Poor, 68  
  Resistance to foreign invasion, 65  
  Revolutionary demands of, 68-69  
  Scholars, 67  
  Society, 4, 6, 63

  Neo-colonial, 69  
  Values, 70  
Food production campaign, 42  
Free enterprise economy, 27  
Freedom, 5, 37  
  Of assembly, 19  
  Of speech *see* Free Speech  
Future, concept of, 10  
Future viewing *see* Futuristics  
Futuristics, 9

## G

Geothermal power, exploitation of, 28  
Government, 60, 70, 77  
  And private entrepreneurship, 27  
  And the poor, 2  
  As an autonomous entity, 25, 26  
  Autonomy, 27  
  Centralized, 81  
  Commitment to free enterprise, 27  
  Confidence in, 34  
  Consciousness, 33  
  Credibility, 19  
  Effective, 34, 35  
  Efficacy of, 33  
  Employees, standardization of compensation, 50  
  Functions of, 59, 70  
  Intentions of, 29  
  Interference in areas of economic activity, 27  
  Legitimate, 27  
  Objectives of, 78  
  Parliamentary, 81  
  Powers of, 25  
  Program of, 1, 42  
  Reins of, 25  
  Reorganization of, 50



Restructuring of, 50  
 Role of, 34, 59, 60  
 Transistion to a  
     parliamentary democracy,  
     34  
 Workings of, 33  
 Graft and corruption,  
     eradication of, 50  
 Grotius, 5

## H

Hereditary successors, 38  
 Herodotus, 82  
 Historical materialism, 8  
 Historical past, search for, 29  
 Housing problems, 58  
 Human creativity, history of, 15  
 Human freedom, 80  
     Expansion of, 50  
 Human rationality, concept of,  
     15  
 Human rights, 15, 16-17  
 Human society, 5  
     Principles of, 5  
     Recreation of, 70  
 Humanism, 15  
     Ideal of, 14  
     Philosophy of, 14  
 Humanistic credo, 14  
 Humanistic principles, 70

## I

IBP *see* Interim Batasang Pam-  
     bansa  
 INA *see* Interim National As-  
     sembly  
 Ideological thinking, 10  
 Ideology, 1-11  
     Attitude towards, 3  
     Borrowed, 11  
     Demystification of, 4

External, 6  
 Features of, 4-5  
 Illiteracy, elimination of, 61  
 Indigenous culture, 69  
 Individual survival, struggle for,  
     70  
 Individual transformation, 71  
 Individualism, 20  
 Individualist credo, 20  
 Industrial labor, 44  
 Influence-peddling, 38  
 Intellectual elite, 17, 33  
 Intellectual needs, 71  
 Intellectual subjugation, 65  
 Interim Batasang Pambansa, 48-  
     50  
 Interim National Assembly, 48  
*Intermediate* future, 9  
 Intervention, right of, 55-56

## J

Jacinto, Emilio, 60  
 Jacobin revolution, 24, 25, 26  
 Japanese occupation, 75  
*Justitia communis*, 56

## K

Kant, Immanuel, 14  
*Katipunan*, 69

## L

Labor legislation  
     In the United States, 55  
*Laissez faire* policy, 55  
 Lapu-Lapu, 65  
 Laurel, Jose P., 55-57  
 Lawmaking, 45  
 Laws, humanization of, 57  
 Leadership, strong, 34  
 Legislative Advisory Council  
     *see* Batasang Bayan



Leibnitz, 56  
 Liberation, 75  
     Struggle for, 66  
 Libertarian tradition, 21  
 Literature, 65  
 Local government system,  
     needs of, 43  
 Lupong Tagapagpaganap,  
     members of, 48

## M

Mabini, Apolinario, 60  
 Magsaysay, Ramon, 61  
 Makalintal, Querube, 59  
 Malolos Congress, 37  
 Man, nature of, 14-15  
 Martial Law, 19, 49, 66, 67, 76  
     Declaration of, 18, 23  
     Moral fulfillment of, 77  
     Opposition to, 18  
 Marxism-Leninism  
     Values of, 6  
 Mass mobilization, 28  
 "Mass organizations," 46  
 Mass political participation,  
     28, 67  
 Mass poverty, 59, 77  
     Conquest of, 83  
 Mass prosperity, 79  
 Material transformations, 63  
 Moral reform, 63  
 Moro-moros, 66  
 Mutual responsibility  
     Concept of, 81

## N

Nation-building, 81  
     Challenge of, 82  
 National aspirations, 80  
 National Assembly, 47  
 National community, 16

National consciousness, frag-  
     mented, 68  
 National culture, 69  
 National destiny, 79  
 National emergencies, 81  
 National energy, 81  
 National groups, 23  
 National identity, 67  
     Search for, 29  
 National interest, 40  
 National leadership, 76  
 National life, 71  
 National planning, 1  
 National politics, 41  
 National resources, use of, 39  
 National resurgence, 80  
 National society  
     Classes in, 77  
 National solidarity, 42  
 National success, 81  
 National survival, 28, 77, 82  
 New Society, 1, 50, 64, 67, 70,  
     75-83  
     Foundations of, 58  
     Government, 80  
     Mandate of, 76  
     Need for, 82  
     Revolutionary instrument of  
         the people, 77  
*Notes on the New Society II*, 2

## O

Ocean of democracy, 72  
 Oil price, 28  
 Old society, 38, 64, 70, 83  
 Oligarchs, 34  
 Oligarchy, 21, 27, 31, 33, 34, 38  
     Dehumanized, 68  
     Filipino, 30  
 "Open" ideology, 3



- P**
- P.D. No. 86, 40, 42
  - P.D. No. 86-A, 40
  - P.D. No. 557, 41
  - P.D. No. 826, 40, 43, 45, 46
  - P.D. No. 877, 47
  - P.D. No. 925, 47, 48
  - P.D. No. 995, 47
  - Pacification, process of, 65
  - Padrinos*, 67
  - Pampook na Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian*, 47, 48
  - Partisan clamor, 80
  - Pasyon*, 66
  - Patronage, culture of, 33
  - Peace and order
    - Maintenance of, 50
    - Radical improvement in, 18
  - Permanent truth, 2
  - Philippine(s), 4
    - Colony, 66
    - Development plans, 61-62
    - Politics, 39
    - Society, 13, 23, 37
  - Political authority, 81, 83
  - Political consciousness, 32
  - Political culture, 20, 21
    - Old, 40
  - Political decision-making, 67
  - Political elite, 76
  - Political epistemology, 32-33
  - Political franchise, 79
  - Political history, 16
  - Political institutions, 20, 40
    - New, 40-41
  - Political leaders, 32
  - Political leadership, 19, 29, 33, 34
    - Autonomous, 29
    - Change in, 18, 32
  - Political liberties, advocates of, 19, 20, 21, 22
  - Political life, nature of, 31
  - Political lords, 34
  - Political needs, 71
  - Political opportunism, 32
  - Political process, 16, 17, 19, 20
  - Political rights, 16, 17, 19, 21
  - Political system, 39
    - Filipino, 43
  - Political upheavals, 18
  - Politicians, national, 32
  - Politics, 32
  - "Politics of conflict," 39
  - Pook*, 41
    - Leaders, 41
  - Poor, 17, 29
    - Conviction of, 70
  - Popular progress, 81
  - Popular representation
    - New system of, 46
    - Types of, 43-45
  - Poverty, 79
    - Attack against, 61
    - Conditions of, 20, 21
    - Result of, 21
  - Power, wielders of, 23
  - Power politics, reality of, 26
  - President, lawmaking functions, 48
  - Principalia*, 30
  - Procedural rights, 16
  - Production, owners of, 24, 25, 26
  - Professionals, 44
  - Progress, 12
  - Proletarian dictatorship, 25, 26
  - Proletarian state, 26
  - Propaganda, 3
  - Public opinion, 75
  - Public policy, 36
  - Public welfare, requirements of, 35



## R

- R.A. No. 3590, 41
- Radical reforms, 33
- Radicalization program, 23
- Rationality, concept of, 14
- Reality, demands of, 15
- Reason, Cartesian conception of, 14
- Rebellion, 18
  - Popular, 31
- Rebellion of the poor, 61
- Referendum
  - January 17, 1973, 49
  - January 30, 1973, 49
  - July 27-28, 1973, 49
  - February 27-28, 1975, 49
- Reformists, 11
- Regionalism, 37
- Religious processions, 66
- Representative democracy, 37-40, 50
- Responsibility, sense of, 71
- Revolution, 24, 32, 76
  - Attitudinal, 69-71
  - Authentic, 23
  - Bloody, 4
  - Constitutional, 79
  - Freedom-oriented, 80-82
  - Goal of, 78
  - Idea of, 23, 24
  - Ideological concept of, 24
  - Material, 69-70
  - Nationally oriented, 78
  - Principles of, 79-80
  - Social orientation of, 78
  - Theory of, 24
- "Revolution from the center", 29, 34
- Revolutionary adventurism, 24
- Revolutionary consciousness, 69

- Revolutionary responsibility, 80
- Rich and poor, gap between, 50

## S

- Salus populi est supreme lex*, 57
- Sangguniang Bayan, 40, 43-47
  - Function of, 46
  - Popular representation to, 43-45
- Sanggunians, policies and efficiencies of, 48
- Scientific revolutions, 15
- "Sectoral associations," 46
- Security, sense of, 20
- Self-reliance, concept of, 28
- Slogans, 3
- Social balance, 5
  - Achievement of, 77
- Social conscience, 70
- Social consciousness, 4
- Social development, 4
  - Marxist theory of, 8
  - Theoreticians of, 2
- "Social equality," 78, 81, 83
- Social imbalance, consequences of, 77
- Social institutions, development of, 15
- Social interrelations, 65
- Social justice, 5, 13, 53-62, 78, 81, 83
  - Definition of, 57
  - In the Constitution, 54, 58
- Promotion of, 56, 57
  - Imperatives of, 61
- Social legislation, 55
- Social needs, 71
- Social order, 79
- Social processes, 11
- Social reality, 2-4, 13



Social reform, 8, 63  
 Social relations, 70  
 Social scale, balancing of, 77  
 Social scientists, 10-11  
 Social transformation, 71  
     Basis of, 15  
 Social upliftment, 68  
 Society, 80  
     Classless, 26  
     Development of, 21  
     Levels of, 7  
     Reorganized, 64  
     Restructuring of, 7, 76  
     Stratification of, 24-25  
     Theory of, 8, 10  
 Socio-cultural activities, 42  
 Socioeconomic system, changes  
     in, 64  
 Sovereign people, 70  
 Sovereignty, 70  
 Spaniards, 69  
 Spanish catholicism, 65  
 Spanish colonization, 13  
 Spanish rule, 65, 69, 75  
 Spanish way of life, 65  
 Sphere of influence, 19  
 State of affairs, 34  
 State power, 25  
 Suicide, 72  
 Supreme Court, 57  
 Survival, 17

## T

Tenure of leadership, 34  
 Third World leader, problems of,  
     35  
 Transformation, process of, 64  
 Travel, right to, 17  
 Trials of reconstruction, 75  
 Tribalism, 37

## U

*Ultimate* future, 9  
 United Nations, 28  
 United States, 37  
 Utopian dream, 7  
 Utopianism, 9

## V

Value judgements, 70  
 Values, 5-6, 13  
     Particular, 5, 8  
     Universal, 6, 8  
 Vilification, 39  
 Virtues, 65  
 Vote-buying, 38

## W

Wealth  
     Acquisition of, 68  
     Re-distribution of, 78  
 Working class, 25



